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Summary
This CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military contacts
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of contacts since
1993.  The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed
sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989.  In 1993,
the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership up to the highest
level and including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  Renewed
military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the
1980s, when the United States and China cooperated strategically against the Soviet
Union, including U.S. arms sales to China.  Improvements and deteriorations in
overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-
1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO
bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision incident in 2001.
Since 2001, the Bush Administration has continued the policy of engagement
with China, while the Pentagon has skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed a
program of military-to-military (mil-to-mil) exchanges.  Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, in 2002, resumed the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) with the PLA
(first held in 1997) and, in 2003, hosted General Cao Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman
of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Defense Minister.  General Richard
Myers (USAF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in January 2004,
as the highest-ranking U.S. military officer to do so since November 2000.  He did
not announce any plan for the highest-ranking PLA officer, General Guo Boxiong,
to visit the United States.  The last time that the highest-ranking PLA officer visited
the United States was General Zhang Wannian’s visit in 1998.  Moreover, no
Secretary of Defense has visited China since Secretary William Cohen’s visit in
2000.  While in Beijing on January 30, 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage acknowledged that “the military-to-military relationship had gotten off to
a rocky start,” but he said that “we’re getting back on track.”
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration has complied with
legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of
contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized list of U.S. security interests.
Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991 (P.L.
101-246) prohibits arms sales to China , among other stipulations, in response to the
Tiananmen Crackdown.  Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) restricts “inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to certain
operational areas and requires reports on contacts with the PLA. 
  Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated
whether the contacts have had significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and
whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA’s warfighting capabilities that
might harm U.S. security interests.  U.S. security interests in mil-to-mil contacts with
China might include communication, conflict-prevention, and crisis-management;
information-gathering; tension-reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation;
counter-terrorism; and accounting for American prisoners-of-war/missing-in-action
(POW/MIAs).  This CRS Report will be updated as warranted.
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U.S.-China Military Contacts:
Issues for Congress
Overview of U.S. Policy
U.S. leaders have applied military contacts as one tool and point of leverage in
the broader policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The first part of
this CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding such military-to-military (mil-to-
mil) contacts.  The second part provides a record of such contacts since 1993, when
the United States resumed exchanges after suspending them in response to the
Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989.
Cooperation in the Cold War
Since the mid-1970s, even before the normalization of relations with Beijing,
the debate over policy toward the PRC has examined how military ties might advance
U.S. security interests, beginning with the imperatives of the Cold War.1  In January
1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China and laid the groundwork for
a relationship with the PRC’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intended
to consist of strategic dialogue, reciprocal exchanges in functional areas, and arms
sales.  Furthermore, U.S. policy changed in 1981 to remove the ban on arms sales to
China.  Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger visited Beijing in September 1983.
In 1984, U.S. policymakers worked to advance discussions on military technological
cooperation with China.2  Between 1985 and 1987, the United States agreed to four
programs of Foreign Military Sales (FMS): modernization of artillery ammunition
production facilities; modernization of avionics in F-8 fighters; sale of four Mark-46
anti-submarine torpedoes; and sale of four AN/TPQ-37 artillery-locating radars.3
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Suspensions after Tiananmen Crackdown
The United States suspended mil-to-mil contacts and arms sales in response to
the Tiananmen Crackdown in June 1989.  (Although the killing of peaceful
demonstrators took place beyond just Tiananmen Square in the capital of Beijing on
June 4, 1989, the crackdown is commonly called the Tiananmen Crackdown in
reference to the square that was the focal point of the nation-wide pro-democracy
movement.)  Approved in February 1990, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for FYs 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246) enacted into law sanctions imposed on arms
sales and other cooperation, while allowing for waivers in the U.S. national interest.
In April 1990, China canceled the program (called “Peace Pearl”) to upgrade the
avionics of the F-8 fighters.4  In December 1992, President Bush decided to close out
the four cases of suspended FMS programs, returning PRC equipment, reimbursing
unused funds, and delivering sold items without support.5
Re-engagement
In the fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC
leadership up to the highest level and across the board, including the PLA.  Renewed
military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the
1980s, when the United States and China cooperated strategically against the Soviet
Union and such cooperation included arms sales to the PLA.  Improvements and
deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected mil-to-mil contacts, with
close ties in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis,
mistaken NATO bombing of the PRC embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the EP-3
aircraft collision incident in 2001.
Re-evaluation
Since 2001, the George W. Bush Administration has continued the policy of
engagement with the PRC, while the Pentagon has skeptically reviewed and
cautiously resumed a program of mil-to-mil exchanges.  Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has reviewed the mil-to-mil contacts to assess the effectiveness of the
exchanges in meeting U.S. objectives of reciprocity and transparency.  As the review
began, on April 1, 2001, a PLA Navy F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3
reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea.6  Upon surviving the collision, the
EP-3’s crew made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan island. The PLA
detained the 24 U.S. Navy personnel for 11 days.  Instead of acknowledging that the
PLA had started aggressive interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights in December
2000 and apologizing for the accident, top PRC ruler Jiang Zemin demanded an
apology and compensation from the United States.  Rumsfeld limited mil-to-mil
contacts after the incident, subject to case-by-case approval, after the White House
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objected to a suspension of contacts with the PLA as outlined in an April 30 Defense
Department memo.  Rumsfeld told reporters on May 8, 2001, that he decided against
visits to China by U.S. ships or aircraft and against social contacts, because “it really
wasn’t business as usual.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reported to
Congress on June 8, 2001, that mil-to-mil exchanges for 2001 remained under review
by Secretary Rumsfeld and exchanges with the PLA would be conducted “selectively
and on a case-by-case basis.”  The United States did not transport the damaged EP-3
out of China until July 3, 2001.
The Bush Administration hosted PRC Vice President Hu Jintao in Washington
in the spring of 2002 (with an honor cordon at the Pentagon) and President Jiang
Zemin in Crawford, Texas, in October 2002.  Afterwards, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, in late 2002, resumed the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) with the PLA
(first held in 1997) and, in 2003, hosted General Cao Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman
of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Defense Minister.  (The CMC under
the Communist Party of China (CPC), chaired by PRC ruler Jiang Zemin, commands
the PLA.  The Ministry of Defense and its titles are used in contacts with foreign
militaries.)  General Richard Myers (USAF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
visited China in January 2004, as the highest-ranking U.S. military officer to do so
since November 2000.  He did not announce any plan for the highest-ranking PLA
officer, General Guo Boxiong, to visit the United States.  The last time that the
highest-ranking PLA officer visited the United States was General Zhang Wannian’s
visit in 1998.  Moreover, no U.S. Secretary of Defense has visited China since
Secretary William Cohen’s visit in 2000.  (See the tables on the PLA’s high
command and the summary of senior-level military visits.)
Visiting Beijing in January 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
met with PRC leaders, including General Cao Gangchuan. Armitage acknowledged
that “the military-to-military relationship had gotten off to a rocky start,” but noted
that the relationship had improved so that “it’s come pretty much full cycle.”  He said
that “we’re getting back on track with the military-to-military relationship.”7  
Congress has exercised oversight of various aspects of military exchanges with
China.  Issues for Congress include whether the Administration has complied with
legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of
contacts with the PLA that advances, and does not harm, U.S. security interests.
Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991 (P.L.
101-246) prohibited arms sales to China , among other stipulations, in response to the
Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989.  Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) restricts “inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to
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Table 1.  The PLA’s High Command
Central Military Commission (CMC)
Chairman Hu Jintao CPC General Secretary; President
Vice Chm General Guo Boxiong Politburo Member
Vice Chm General Cao Gangchuan Politburo Member; Defense Minister
Vice Chm General Xu Caihou CPC Secretary
Member General Liang Guanglie Chief of General Staff (GSD)
Member General Li Jinai Director of GPD
Member General Liao Xilong Director of GLD
Member General Chen Bingde Director of GAD
Member General Qiao Qingchen Commander of the Air Force
Member Admiral Zhang Dingfa Commander of the Navy
Member General Jing Zhiyuan Comander of the 2nd Artillery
Notes:  Jiang Zemin was installed as the previous chairman of the CPC’s CMC
in November 1989 and remained in this position after handing other positions
as CPC general secretary and PRC president to Hu Jintao.  Jiang had ruled as
the general secretary of the CPC from June 1989 until November 2002, when
he stepped down at the 16th CPC Congress.  He concurrently represented the
PRC as president from March 1993 until March 2003, when he stepped down at
the 10th National People’s Congress.  At the 4th plenum of the 16th Central
Committee in September 2004, Jiang resigned as CMC chairman, allowing Hu
Jintao to complete the formal transition of power.  At the same time, General
Xu Caihou rose from a CMC member to a vice chairman, and the commanders
of the PLA Air Force, Navy, and 2nd Artillery rose to be CMC members for the
first time in the PLA’s history, reflecting greater attention to joint operations. 
(On overall civilian PRC rulers, see CRS Report RL31661, China’s New
Leadership Line-up: Implications for U.S. Policy.)
CRS-5









1997 John Shalikashvili 1st DCT
1998 William Cohen Zhang Wannian 2nd DCT
1999




2004 Richard Myers 6th DCT
2005 7th DCT
CRS-6
Figure 1.  Map - China’s Military Regions
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Policy Issues for Congress
Skepticism in the United States about the value of military exchanges with China
has increased after the experiences in the 1990s; crises like the PLA’s missile
exercises targeting Taiwan in 1995-1996, mistaken bombing of the PRC embassy in
Belgrade in 1999, and the F-8/EP-3 collision incident of 2001; and changes in the
U.S. policy approach.  The highest-ranking PLA officer has not visited the United
States since General Zhang Wannian’s trip in 1998, and the U.S. Secretary of
Defense has not visited China since Secretary Cohen’s trip in 2000. As the United
States re-evaluates the mil-to-mil relationship, policy issues for Congress include
whether the Administration has complied with legislation and has used leverage
effectively in its contacts with the PLA to advance a prioritized list of U.S. security
interests, while balancing security concerns about the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.
Congressional Oversight
One issue for Congress in examining the military relationship with the PRC is the
role of Congress, including the extent of congressional oversight of the
Administration’s policy.  Congress could, as it has in the past, consider options to:
! Host PLA delegations on Capitol Hill or meet them at other venues
! Engage with the PLA as an aspect of visits by Codels to China
! Receive briefings by the Administration before and/or after military
visits
! Hold hearings on related issues 
! Investigate or oversee investigations of prisoner-of-war/missing-in-
action (POW/MIA) cases (once under the specialized jurisdiction of
the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs)
! Write letters to Administration officials to express congressional
concerns
! Require reports from the Pentagon, particularly in unclassified form
! Review interactions at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
of the Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii
! Fund or prohibit funding for certain commissions or activities
! Pass legislation on sanctions and exchanges with the PLA
! Assess the Administration’s adherence to laws on sanctions,
contacts, and reporting requirements
! Obtain and review the Department of Defense (DOD)’s program for
upcoming mil-to-mil contacts, particularly proposed programs
already discussed with the PLA.
Arms Sales.  Congress has oversight of sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen
Crackdown that were enacted in Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for FYs  1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246).  The sanctions continue to prohibit the
issuance of licenses to export Munitions List items to China, including helicopters
and helicopter parts, as well as crime control equipment.  The President has waiver
authority.  
Related to views of the U.S. ban on arms sales is the European arms embargo.
In January 2004, the European Union (EU) decided to reconsider whether to lift its
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embargo on arms sales to China.  On January 28, 2004, a State Department
spokesman acknowledged that the United States has held “senior-level” discussions
with France and other countries in the EU about the issue of whether to lift the
embargo on arms sales to China.  He said, “certainly for the United States, our
statutes and regulations prohibit sales of defense items to China.  We believe that
others should maintain their current arms embargoes as well.  We believe that the
U.S. and European prohibitions on arms sales are complementary, were imposed for
the same reasons, specifically serious human rights abuses, and that those reasons
remain valid today.”8  At a hearing of the House International Relations Committee
on February 11, 2004, Representative Steve Chabot asked Secretary of State Colin
Powell about the EU’s reconsideration of the arms embargo against China, as
supported by France.  Powell responded that he raised this issue with the foreign
ministers of France, Ireland, United Kingdom, and Germany, and expressed
opposition to a change in the EU’s policy at this time in light of the PLA’s missiles
arrayed against Taiwan, the referendums on sensitive political issues then planned
in Taiwan, and China’s human rights conditions.9
Joint Defense Conversion Commission.  In China in October 1994,
Secretary of Defense William Perry and PLA General Ding Henggao, Director of the
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND),10 set up the U.S.-China Joint Defense Conversion Commission.  Its
stated goal was to facilitate economic cooperation and technical exchanges and
cooperation in the area of defense conversion.
However, on June 1, 1995, the House National Security Committee issued House
Report 104-131 (for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996) and
expressed concerns that this commission led to U.S. assistance to PRC firms with
direct ties to the PLA and possible subsidies to the PLA.  The committee inserted a
section to prohibit the use of DOD funds for activities associated with the
commission.  The Senate’s bill had no similar language.  On January 22, 1996,
conferees reported in Conference Report 104-450 that they agreed to a provision
(Section 1343 in P.L. 104-106) to require the Secretary of Defense to submit semi-
annual reports on the commission.  They also noted that continued U.S.-PRC security
dialogue “can promote stability in the region and help protect American interests and
the interests of America’s Asian allies.”  Nonetheless, they warned that Congress
intends to examine whether that dialogue has produced “tangible results” in human
rights, transparency in military spending and doctrine, missile and nuclear
nonproliferation, and other important U.S. security interests.  Then, in the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201), enacted in September 23,
1996, Congress banned  DOD from using any funds for any activity associated with
the commission until 15 days after the first semi-annual report is received by
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Congress.  In light of this controversy, Secretary Perry terminated the commission
and informed Congress in a letter dated July 18, 1996.
Past Reporting Requirement.  Also in 1996, the House National Security
Committee issued House Report 104-563 (for the National Defense Authorization
Act of FY1997) that sought a “full accounting and detailed presentation” of all DOD
interaction with the PRC government and PLA, including technology-sharing,
conducted during 1994-1996 and proposed for 1997-1998, and required a classified
and unclassified report by February 1, 1997.  DOD submitted the unclassified report
on February 21, 1997, and did not submit a classified version, saying that the
unclassified report was comprehensive and that no contacts covered in the report
included the release of classified material or technology sharing.
Programs of Exchanges.  Certain Members of Congress have written to the
Secretary of Defense to express concerns that mil-to-mil exchanges have not
adequately benefitted U.S. interests.  In early 1999, under the Clinton Administration,
the Washington Times disclosed the existence of a “Gameplan for 1999 U.S.-Sino
Defense Exchanges,” and Pentagon spokesperson Kenneth Bacon confirmed that an
exchange program had been under way for years.11  Representative Dana
Rohrabacher wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, saying that “after
reviewing the ‘Game Plan,’ it appears evident that a number of events involving PLA
logistics, acquisitions, quartermaster and chemical corps representatives may benefit
PLA modernization to the detriment of our allies in the Pacific region and, ultimately,
the lives of own service members.”  He requested a detailed written description of
various exchanges.12  
In December 2001, under the Bush Administration, Senator Bob Smith and
Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
expressing concerns about renewed military contacts with the PRC.  They contended
that military exchanges failed to reduce tensions (evident in the EP-3 incident),
lacked reciprocity, and provided militarily-useful information to the PLA.  They
charged that the Clinton Administration “largely ignored” the spirit and intent of
legislation governing military exchanges with the PLA, including a “violation” of the
law by allowing the PLA to visit the Joint Forces Command in August 2000, and, as
initiators of the legislation, they “reminded” Rumsfeld of the congressional
restrictions.13
In February 2004 in Beijing, the Defense Department and the PLA held the sixth
Defense Consultative Talks (DCT).  Afterwards, the PRC Foreign Ministry said that
the two sides discussed a program for mil-to-mil contacts in 2004.
Prohibitions in the FY2000 NDAA.  Enacted on October 5, 1999, the
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) set parameters to contacts
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with the PLA.  Section 1201 of the NDAA for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) prohibits the
Secretary of Defense from authorizing any mil-to-mil contact with the PLA if that
contact would “create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure” of
the PLA to any of the following 12 operational areas (with exceptions granted to any
search and rescue or humanitarian operation or exercise):
! Force projection operations
! Nuclear operations
! Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations
! Advanced logistical operations
! Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to
weapons of mass destruction
! Surveillance and reconnaissance operations
! Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to
transformations in warfare
! Military space operations
! Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces
! Arms sales or military-related technology transfers
! Release of classified or restricted information
! Access to a DOD laboratory.
The Secretary of Defense — rather than an authority in Congress or outside of the
Defense Department — is also required to submit an annual written certification by
December 31 of each year as to whether any military contact with China that the
Secretary of Defense authorized in that year was a “violation” of the restrictions.
Required Reports and Classification.  Section 1201(f) of the NDAA for
FY2000 required an unclassified report by March 31, 2000, on past military-to-
military contacts with the PRC.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted
this report in January 2001.  
Section 1201(e) requires an annual report, by March 31 of each year starting in
2001, from the Secretary of Defense on the Secretary’s assessment of the state of mil-
to-mil exchanges and contacts with the PLA, including past contacts, planned
contacts, the benefits that the PLA expects to gain, the benefits that DOD expects to
gain, and the role of such contacts for the larger security relationship with the PRC.
The law did not specify whether the report shall be unclassified and/or classified.  In
the report submitted in January 2001 (on past mil-to-mil exchanges), the Pentagon
stated that “as a matter of policy, all exchange activities are conducted at the
unclassified level.  Thus, there is no data included on the section addressing PLA
access to classified data as a result of exchange activities.”  On June 8, 2001, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz signed and submitted an unclassified report on
the mil-to-mil exchanges in 2000 under the Clinton Administration and did not
provide a schedule of activities for 2001, saying that the 2001 program was under
review by the Secretary of Defense.  
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However, concerning contacts with the PLA under the Bush Administration,  the
Secretary of Defense submitted reports on military exchanges with China in May
2002 and May 2003 that were classified “Confidential” and not made public.14
Leverage to Pursue U.S. Security Objectives
Objectives.  At different times, under the Clinton and Bush Administrations,
DOD has pursued exchanges with the PLA to various degrees of closeness as part of
the policy of engagement in the bilateral relationship with China.  The record of the
mil-to-mil contacts in over ten years can be used to evaluate the extent to which those
contacts provided tangible benefits to advance U.S. security goals.  In briefing
Congress in March 1997, DOD said that the objectives of mil-to-mil relations were
to: 
! Increase PLA transparency
! Demonstrate U.S. military capabilities
! Advance U.S.-PRC security dialogue through discussions with PLA
leadership
! Develop confidence building measures (CBMs) designed to reduce
chances of miscalculations and accidents between operational forces
! Pursue bilateral functional exchanges that are beneficial to DOD and
the U.S. military (e.g., military medicine) and/or that provide
operational insights on the PLA
! Routinize senior-level defense dialogue to ensure open
communications during tensions
! Monitor the PLA’s influence in PRC internal politics and foreign
policy decision-making
! Expand PLA participation in appropriate multinational and
multilateral military activities.
The Pentagon’s last East Asia strategy report issued by Secretary of Defense
Cohen in November 1998 placed “comprehensive engagement” with China in third
place among nine components of the U.S. strategy.  It said that U.S.-PRC dialogue
was “critical” to ensure understanding of each other’s regional security interests,
reduce misperceptions, increase understanding of PRC security concerns, and build
confidence to “avoid military accidents and miscalculations.”  While calling the
strategic non-targeting agreement announced at the summit in June 1998 a
“symbolic” action, it asserted that the action “reassured both sides and reaffirmed our
constructive relationship.”  The report further pointed to the presidential hot-line set
up in May 1998, Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and  Defense
Consultative Talks (DCT) as achievements in engagement with the PLA.15
In a report to Congress on June 8, 2001, required by the NDAA for FY2000, P.L.
106-65, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wrote that military exchanges
in 2000 sought to:
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! foster an environment conducive to frank, open discussion
! complement the broader effort to engage the PRC
! reduce the likelihood of miscalculations regarding cross-strait issues.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told reporters on May 31, 2002, that
“we believe that the contact between American military personnel and Chinese
military personnel can reduce misunderstandings on both sides and can help build a
better basis for cooperation when opportunities arise.  So we’d like to enhance those
opportunities for interaction but we believe that to be successful we have to have
principles of transparency and reciprocity.  It’s very important that there’s mutual
benefit to both sides....  The more each country knows about what the other one is
doing, the less danger is there, I believe, of misunderstanding and confrontation.”16
In agreeing to discuss a resumption of mil-to-mil contacts, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld told reporters on June 21, 2002, that Assistant Secretary of Defense
Peter Rodman would talk to the PLA about the principles of transparency,
reciprocity, and consistency for mil-to-mil contacts that Rumsfeld stressed to Vice
President Hu Jintao at the Pentagon in May 2002.
After the fifth DCT in December 2002, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith said that if contacts are structured property, “they will serve our
interests, they will serve our common interests.  And the principal interest is in
reducing the risks of mistake, miscalculation, and misunderstanding.  If these
military-to-military exchanges actually lead to our gaining insights into Chinese
thinking and policies and capabilities and the like, and they can gain insights into
ours, then it doesn’t mean we’ll necessarily agree on everything, but it at least means
that as we’re making our policies, we’re making them on the basis of accurate
information.”17
Debate.  U.S. security objectives in mil-to-mil contacts with China have
included gaining insights about the PLA’s capabilities and concepts; deterrence
against a PLA use of force or coercion against Taiwan or U.S. allies; reduction in
tensions in the Taiwan Strait; strategic arms control; weapons nonproliferation in
countries such as like North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan; closer engagement with top
PRC leaders; freedom of navigation and flight; preventing dangers to U.S. military
personnel operating in proximity to the PLA; minimizing misperceptions and
miscalculations; and accounting for American POW/MIAs.  
Skeptics of U.S.-PRC mil-to-mil contacts say they have had little value for
achieving these U.S. objectives.  Instead that they contend that the contacts served
to inform the PLA as it builds its warfighting capability against Taiwan and the
United States, which it views as a potential adversary, and seemed to reward
belligerence.  They oppose rehabilitation of PLA officers involved in the Tiananmen
Crackdown.  They question whether the PLA has shown transparency and
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(continued...)
reciprocated with equivalent or substantive access, and urge greater attention to U.S.
allies over China.  From this perspective, the ups and downs in the military
relationship reflect its use as a tool in the bilateral political relationship, in which the
PRC at times had leverage over the United States.  Thus, they contend, a realistic
appraisal of the nature of the PLA threat would call for caution in military contacts
with China, perhaps limiting them to exchanges such as strategic talks and senior-
level policy dialogues, rather than operational areas that involve military capabilities.
A former U.S. Army Attache in Beijing wrote in 1999 that under the Clinton
Administration, military-to-military contacts allowed PLA officers “broad access”
to U.S. warships, exercises, and even military manuals.  He argued that “many of the
military contacts between the United States and China over the years helped the PLA
attain its goals [in military modernization].”  He called for limiting exchanges to
strategic dialogue on weapons proliferation, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, freedom
of navigation, missile defense, etc.  He urged policymakers not to “improve the
PLA’s capability to wage war against Taiwan or U.S. friends and allies, its ability to
project force, or its ability to repress the Chinese people.”18  He also testified to
Congress in 2000 that the PLA conceals its capabilities in exchanges with the United
States.  For example, he said, the PLA invited General John Shalikashvili, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to see the capabilities of the 15th Airborne Army (in May
1997), but it showed him a highly scripted routine.  Furthermore, the PLA allowed
Secretary of Defense Cohen to visit an Air Defense Command Center (in January
1998), but it was “a hollow shell of a local headquarters; it was not the equivalent of
America’s National Command Center” that was shown to PRC leaders.19
In 2000, Randy Schriver, a former official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, discussed lessons learned in conducting military exchanges during the
Clinton Administration and argued for limiting such exchanges.  Schriver assessed
senior-level talks as exchanges of talking points rather than real dialogue, but
nonetheless helpful.  He considered the MMCA a successful confidence-building
measure (not knowing the EP-3 aircraft collision incident would occur less than one
year later in April 2001).  He also said it was positive to have PLA participation in
multilateral fora and to expose younger PLA officers to American society.  However,
Schriver said that the United States “failed miserably” in gaining a window on the
PLA’s modernization, gaining neither access as expected nor reciprocity; failed to
shape China’s behavior while allowing China to shape the behavior of some
American  “ardent suitors”; and failed to deter the PLA’s aggression while whetting
the PLA’s appetite in planning against a potential American adversary.  He disclosed
that the Pentagon needed to exert control over the Pacific Command’s contacts with
the PLA, with the Secretary of Defense issuing a memo to set guidelines.  He also
called for continuing consultations with Congress.20
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Proponents of military exchanges with the PRC point out that contacts with the
PLA cannot be expected to equal contacts with allies in transparency, reciprocity, and
consistency.  They argue that the mil-to-mil contacts nonetheless promote U.S.
interests and allow the U.S. military to gain insights into the PLA, including its top
leadership, that no other bilateral contacts provide.  U.S. military attaches, led by the
Defense Attache at the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral, have contacts at
levels lower than the top PLA leaders and are subject to strict surveillance in China.
In addition to chances for open intelligence collection, the military relationship can
minimize miscalculations and misperceptions, and foster pro-U.S. leanings and
understanding, particularly among younger officers who might lead in the future.
Proponents caution against treating China as if it is already an enemy, since the
United States seeks China’s cooperation on international security issues.  There
might be benefits in cooperation in military medicine to deal with global outbreaks
of diseases like SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2003, during which a
PLA doctor, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, revealed the PRC leadership’s coverup of SARS
cases at premier PLA hospitals.21  Since the early 1990s, Congress and the Defense
Department have viewed China as the key to getting information to resolve the cases
of POW/MIAs from the Korean War.
Citing several exchanges in 1998 (Commander of the Pacific Command’s visit
that included the first foreign look at the 47th Group Army, a U.S. Navy ship visit to
Shanghai, and naval consultative talks at Naval Base Coronado), the U.S. Naval
Attache in Beijing wrote that “the process of mutual consultation, openness, and
sharing of concerns and information needed to preclude future misunderstandings
and to build mutual beneficial relations is taking place between the U.S. and China’s
armed forces, especially in the military maritime domain.”  He stressed that “the
importance of progress in this particular area of the Sino-American relationship
cannot be overestimated.”22
Two former U.S. military attaches posted to China maintained in a report that
“regardless of whether it is a high-level DoD delegation or a functional exchange of
medical officers, the U.S. military does learn something about the PLA from every
visit.”  They advocated that “the United States should fully engage China in a
measured, long-term military-to-military exchange program that does not help the
PLA improve its warfighting capabilities.”  They said, “the most effective way to
ascertain developments in China’s military and defense policies is to have face-to-
CRS-15
23 Kenneth Allen and Eric McVadon, “China’s Foreign Military Relations,” Stimson Center,
October 1999.
24 Dennis Blasko, “Bei Jian 0308: Did Anyone Hear the Sword on the Inner Mongolian
Plains?” RUSI Chinese Military Update, October 2003.
25 Xinhua, September 2, 2004; Liberation Army Daily, September 3, 2004; Jane’s Defense
Weekly, September 22, 2004.
26 David Finkelstein and John Unangst, “Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military
Relations with the United States,” CNA Corporation, October 1999.
face contact at multiple levels over an extended period of time.”  Thus, they argued,
“even though the PLA minimizes foreign access to PLA facilities and key officials,
the United States has learned, and can continue to learn, much about the PLA through
its long-term relationship.”23  
Another former U.S. military attache in Beijing (from 1992 to 1995)
acknowledged that he saw many PLA drills and demonstrations by “showcase” units
and never any unscripted training events.  Nonetheless, he noted that in August 2003,
the PLA arranged for 27 military observers from the United States and other
countries to be the first foreigners to observe a PLA exercise at its largest training
base (which is in the Inner Mongolia region under the Beijing Military Region).  He
wrote that “by opening this training area and exercise to foreign observers, the
Chinese military leadership obviously was attempting to send a message about its
willingness to be more ‘transparent’ in order to ‘promote friendship and mutual trust
between Chinese and foreign armed forces.”24  However, in a second PLA exercise
opened to foreign observers, the “Dragon 2004” landing exercise at the Shanwei
amphibious operations training base in Guangdong province in September 2004, only
7 foreign military observers from France, Germany, Britain, and Mexico attended,
with no Americans (if invited).25 
Perspectives.  The Center for Naval Analyses found in a study that U.S. and
PRC approaches to military exchanges are “diametrically opposed,” thus raising
tensions at times.  While the United States has pursued a “bottom-up” effort starting
with lower-level contact to work toward mutual understanding and then strategic
agreement, the PRC has sought a “trickle-down” relationship in which agreement on
strategic issues results in understanding and then allows for specific activities later.
The study said that “the PLA leadership regards the military relationship with the
U.S. as a political undertaking for strategic reasons — not a freestanding set of
military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons.
Fundamentally, the military relationship is a vehicle to pursue strategic political
ends.”  While recognizing that using the military relationship to enhance military
modernization is extremely important to the PLA, the study contended that “it is not
the key motive force driving the PLA’s engagement with DOD.”  The report also
argued that because the PLA suspects the United States uses the military relationship
for deterrence, intelligence, and influence, “it seems ludicrous for them to expose
their strengths and weaknesses to the world’s ‘sole superpower’.”  It noted that using
“reciprocity” as a measure of progress “is sure to lead to disappointment.”26
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U.S. Security Interests
With lessons learned, a fundamental issue in overall policy toward China is how
to use U.S. leadership and leverage in managing a prudent program of military
contacts that advances, and does not harm, a prioritized list of U.S. security interests.
The Pentagon could pursue such a program with focused control by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; with consultation with Congress and public disclosures; and
in coordination with allies and friends in the region, such as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and Singapore.  Such a program might include these objectives.
Communication, Conflict-Avoidance, and Crisis-Management.  The
various incidents of direct confrontation between the U.S. military and PLA might
call for greater cooperation with China to improve communication, conflict-
avoidance, and crisis-management.  Analysts in China have studied the government’s
strengths and weaknesses in crisis-management in light of the EP-3 incident in
2001.27  The crisis over the EP-3 collision incident showed the limits in benefits to
the United States of pursuing personal relationships with PLA leaders, the
consultations under the MMCA, as well as the presidential hot-line.  From the
beginning of the crisis, PRC ruler Jiang Zemin pressed the United States with a hard-
line stance, while PLA generals followed without any greater inflammatory rhetoric.28
The MMCA, initialed at the first DCT in December 1997 and signed by Secretary
Cohen in Beijing in January 1998, only arranged meetings to talk about maritime and
air safety.  There was no mechanism for communication during crises or agreement
on rules of engagement.  During his second visit to China as PACOM Commander
in December 1997, Admiral Prueher said that “I remember wishing I had your
telephone number,” in response to a PLA naval officer’s question about Prueher’s
thinking during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996.29  After becoming ambassador
to China in December 1999, Prueher was nonetheless frustrated when the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the PLA would not answer the phone or return phone calls in
the immediate aftermath of the EP-3 collision incident.30
Still, some believe there could be benefits in fostering relationships with PLA
officers, both at the senior level and with younger, future leaders.  While in Beijing
in January 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, said that
“it’s always an advantage to be able to pick up a telephone and talk to somebody that
you know fairly well.  The relationship that I have with General Liang [Chief of
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General Staff], the relationship that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has with his
counterpart, General Cao, is going to be helpful in that regard.”31
At the DCT in February 2004, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith
proposed a hotline for crisis-management with the PLA.  Reflecting a lack of
enthusiasm, the PLA continued to study the notion through the next DCT in April
2005.
Information-Gathering.  Critics of military exchanges with China have
charged that the United States gained limited information about the PLA, while
granting greater access to the PLA than the access we received.  A question in the
debate has concerned the extent to which the issues of reciprocity and transparency
should affect efforts to increase mutual understanding with the PLA.
According to the Pentagon’s report submitted to Congress in January 2001, in
1998, the PLA denied requests by the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ryan,
to fly in an SU-27 fighter, see integration of the SU-27s into units, and see progress
in development of the F-10 fighter.  Also in 1998, the PLA denied a U.S. request for
Secretary of Defense Cohen to visit China’s National Command Center.  Still, the
PLA requested access to U.S. exercises showing warfighting capabilities, with two
cases of denial by the Pentagon in 1999: PLA requests to send observers to the U.S.
Army’s premier National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin in California and to
the Red Flag air combat training exercise at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada (see
entry on PLA delegation’s visit in March 1999).
Regarding controversial access to the U.S. Army’s NTC, visits by PLA
delegations in the 1990s included those in November 1994 and December 1997.32
Then, in December 1998, the U.S. Army reportedly resisted a PLA request for
greater, unprecedented access to the NTC in 1999, because the PLA asked for access
greater than that granted to other countries, the PLA would gain information to
enhance its warfighting, and the PLA was unlikely to reciprocate with similar access
for the U.S. military.  The PLA wanted to observe, with direct access, the 3rd Infantry
Division (Mechanized) and the 82nd Airborne Division in a training exercise.  Army
officials reportedly felt pressured by Admiral Prueher at PACOM and Secretary
Cohen to grant the request.  In the end, the Pentagon announced on March 17, 1999,
that it denied the PLA’s request.33
The Defense Department’s 2003 report to Congress on PRC military power
charged that “since the 1980s, U.S. military exchange delegations to China have been
shown only ‘showcase’ units, never any advanced units or any operational training
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or realistic exercises.”34  However, a Rand study in 2004 argued that the DOD’s
statement “appears to be inaccurate.”  Rand reported that between 1993 and 1999,
U.S. visitors went to 51 PLA units.  (PLA delegations visited 71 U.S. military units
between 1994 and 1999.)  The report recommended that “the best way of dealing
with the reciprocity and transparency issue is to remove it as an issue.”  It called for
proper planning and a focus on educational exchanges.35  
U.S. participants in contacts with the PLA have reported gaining insights into
PLA capabilities and concepts.  The record of military contacts since 1993 (in the
second part of this CRS Report) shows that there were instances when the PLA
provided U.S. visitors with unprecedented access, including at such units as the:
! Satellite Control Center in Xian (1995)
! Guangzhou Military Region headquarters (1997)
! Beijing Military Region’s Air Defense Command Center (1998)
! 47th Group Army (1998)
! Armored Force Engineering Academy (2000)
! Training base in Inner Mongolia (2003), with multinational access
! Zhanjiang, homeport of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (2003)
! Beijing Aerospace Control Center (2004).
Tension-Reduction Over Taiwan.  Tensions over Taiwan have continued
to flare since the mid-1990s, with many observers fearing the possibility of war
looming between the United States and China — two nuclear powers.  The Bush
Administration  maintains that it has managed a balanced policy toward Beijing and
Taipei that preserves peace and stability.  Nonetheless, in April 2004, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly testified to Congress that U.S. efforts at deterring
China’s coercion “might fail” if Beijing becomes convinced that it must stop Taiwan
from advancing on a course toward permanent separation from China.36  Kelly also
noted that the PRC leadership accelerated the PLA buildup after 1999.  The Pentagon
reported to Congress in May 2004 that the PLA has “accelerated” modernization,
including a missile buildup, in response to concerns about Taiwan.37 
Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, that has governed U.S. policy
toward Taiwan since 1979, Congress has oversight of the President’s management
of the cross-strait situation under the rubric of the “one China” policy.38 While
considering contacts with the PLA, the United States, after the 1995-1996 Taiwan
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Strait Crisis, has increased arms sales to and ties with Taiwan’s military.39  Policy
considerations include offering arms sales and cooperation to help Taiwan’s self-
defense; securing leverage over Beijing and Taipei; deterring aggression or coercion;
discouraging provocations from Beijing or Taipei; and supporting cross-strait
dialogue and confidence-building measures.  In educational exchanges with the PLA,
questions have concerned whether to allow PLA officers to attend U.S. military
academies, colleges, or universities, and how that change could affect attendees from
Taiwan’s military; and whether to allow attendees from Taiwan at PACOM’s Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).
Concerning the APCSS courses in Honolulu, the Bush Administration’s policy
change to allow attendance from Taiwan has affected the PLA’s attendance and
interactions among the U.S., PRC, and other Asian militaries.  In November 2001,
the Department of Defense directed APCSS to allow people from Taiwan to
participate in courses and conferences.  Acknowledging the potential difficulty for
continuing participation by the PLA, the policy called for alternating invitations to
the PRC and Taiwan.  In the summer of 2002, three fellows from Taiwan attended
the Executive Course, the first time that Taiwan sent students to APCSS.
Dissatisfied with alternating attendance with Taiwan’s representatives, the PLA
stopped sending representatives to APCSS courses and conferences by 2004.40
While the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 terminated at the end of 1979 and the
TRA does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan, the TRA states that it is
U.S. policy, among other points:
! to consider any non-peaceful efforts to determine the future of
Taiwan, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific region and of “grave concern” to the
United States;
! to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character (making
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability);
! to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
There is a question about the extent of the U.S. role in supporting cross-strait
dialogue. In Shanghai in July 2000, visiting Secretary of Defense Cohen said that the
Clinton Administration viewed the newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian of
Taiwan as offering hope for cross-strait reconciliation.  Cohen stepped out of the
narrow mil-to-mil context and met with Wang Daohan, chairman of the PRC’s
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).  This meeting raised
questions about the U.S. role in more actively encouraging cross-strait talks.  Cohen
said that Chen showed flexibility after becoming president and that there was a
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window of opportunity for changes.41  In contrast, in Beijing in February 2004,
visiting Under Secretary of Defense Feith said he did not discuss the contentious
issue raised by PLA leaders “at length” concerning referendums in Taiwan — an
issue over which the PRC threatened to use force.  Feith said he did not discuss the
issue because it was not defense-related.42
Weapons Nonproliferation.  Despite past engagement with the PLA to seek
cooperation in weapons nonproliferation, the United States continues to have
concerns about PRC entities and has repeatedly imposed sanctions.43  Secretary of
Defense Cohen visited China and urged its commitment to weapons nonproliferation.
China did not join in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced
by President Bush in May 2003 (to interdict dangerous shipments). 
There is a debate about the policy of the Bush Administration in engaging China
 — and the PLA — in a multilateral effort to achieve the dismantlement of North
Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.  In April 2003, China hosted trilateral talks
among the United States, China, and North Korea.  Then, China hosted the first
round of six-nation talks in August 2003 that also included Japan, South Korea, and
Russia.  The following month, PLA units replaced para-military People’s Armed
Police units along China’s border with North Korea, apparently to signal to
Pyongyang the seriousness of the tensions and warn against provocative actions.
Beijing hosted additional rounds of six-party talks in February and June 2004.  After
the third round, PRC leaders hosted North Korea’s defense minister in July 2004.
However, some observers say little has been achieved since the critical issue with
North Korea began in October 2002.  They also question whether China has been
adequately assertive in using its economic and political leverage over North Korea
and whether China shares the U.S. goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement — not just a freeze — of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.
China, nonetheless, has stated its desire for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
Counter-Terrorism.  The PRC’s cooperation in counter-terrorism after the
attacks on September 11, 2001, has not included military cooperation with the U.S.
military.  The U.S. Commanders of the Central and Pacific Commands, General
Tommy Franks and Admiral Dennis Blair, separately confirmed in April 2002 that
China did not provide military cooperation (nor was it requested) in Operation
Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (e.g., basing, staging, or
overflight) and that China’s shared intelligence was not specific enough.  Also, the
Pentagon issued a report in June 2002 on the international coalition fighting terrorism
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and did not include China among the countries providing military contributions.
China has provided diplomatic support, cited by the State Department.44
Some have urged caution in military cooperation with China on this front, while
others see benefits for the U.S. war on terrorism.  Senator Bob Smith and
Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in late 2001,
to express concerns about renewed military contacts with China.  In part, they argued
that “China is not a good prospect for counter-terrorism cooperation,” because of
concerns that China has practiced internal repression in the name of counter-terrorism
and has supplied technology to rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism.45  In
contrast, a report by Rand in 2004 urged a program of security management with
China that includes counter-terrorism as one of three components.46
Accounting for POW/MIAs.  For humanitarian reasons or to advance the
broader U.S.-PRC relationship, the PLA has been helpful in U.S. efforts to resolve
POW/MIA cases from World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War.  In
February 2001, the Defense Department characterized PRC assistance to the United
States in recovering remains from World War II as “generous,” citing the missions
in 1994 in Tibet and in 1997-1999 in Maoer Mountain in southern China.47
However, for over a decade — even as the survivors of those lost in the Korean
War are aging and dying — the United States has faced a challenge in securing the
PLA’s cooperation in U.S. accounting for POW/MIAs from the Korean War.
Despite visits by the Director of the Defense POW/MIA Office and other senior U.S.
military leaders to China and improved overall bilateral relations, the United States
has not been able to announce progress in obtaining such cooperation from the PLA.
In April 1992, a military official in Eastern Europe supplied a report to then
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, alleging that “several dozen” American military
personnel captured in the Korean War (1950-1953) were sent to a camp in the
Northeastern city of Harbin in China where they were used in psychological and
medical experiments before being executed or dying in captivity.48  In May 1992, the
State Department raised the issue of POW/MIAs with the PRC, saying it was a
“matter of the highest national priority,” and in June 1992, the Senate Select
Committee on POW/MIA Affairs received information from the Russian government
indicating that over 100 American POWs captured in the Korean War were
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interrogated by the Soviet Union and possibly sent to China.49  The United States also
presented to the PRC a list of 125 American military personnel still unaccounted for
since the Korean War, who were believed to have been interrogated in the Soviet
Union and then sent to China.  China responded to the United States that it did not
receive anyone on that list from the former Soviet Union.50  But that response
apparently did not address whether China received American military personnel from
North Korea or China itself transferred them.  
Upon returning from North Korea and Southeast Asia in December 1992, Senator
Robert Smith, Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
disclosed that officials in Pyongyang admitted that “hundreds” of American POWs
captured in the Korean War were sent to China and did not return to North Korea.
According to Smith, North Korean officials said that China’s PLA operated POW
camps in North Korea during the Korean War and the Cold War and detained
Americans in China’s northeastern region.  Moreover, North Korean officials told
Smith that some American POWs could have been sent to the Soviet Union for
further interrogations.  Smith advocated that the U.S. government press the PRC
government for information on POWs rather than accept the PRC’s denials that it had
POWs or information about them, saying “this is where the answers lie.”51  (The
Senate created the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in August 1991, chaired
by Senator John Kerry.  It concluded in December 1992, after gaining “important
new information” from North Korea on China’s involvement with U.S. POWs.52)
Secretary of Defense Cohen visited China in 1998 and stressed cooperation on
POW/MIA cases one of four priorities in relations with the PLA.  After visiting
China in January 1999 to seek the PLA’s cooperation in opening its secret archives
on the Korean War, the Director of the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), Robert
Jones, said that “we believe that Chinese records of the war may hold the key to
resolving the fates of many of our missing servicemen from the Korean War.”  The
office’s spokesman, Larry Greer, reported that the PRC agreed to look into the U.S.
request to access the archives.53  In March 2003, DPMO Director Jerry Jennings
visited China and said that PRC records likely hold “the key” to resolving some
POW/MIA cases from the Korean War.54
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55 Confirmed in discussions with DPMO officials, January 29, 2004.
56 Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office, “Personnel Accounting Progress in China as of
February 4, 2005,” February 2005.
Just days after the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, visited
Beijing in January 2004, PRC media reported on January 19, 2004, that the
government declassified the first batch of over 10,000 files in its archives on the
PRC’s foreign relations from 1949 to 1955.  However, this step apparently excluded
wartime records, and General Myers did not announce cooperation by China in
providing information in its archives related to American POW/MIAs from the
Korean War.  DOD has not received such cooperation from the PLA.55  The PRC
later announced in July 2004 the declassification of a second batch of similar files.
In February 2005, DPMO acknowledged that PRC cooperation on Korean War cases
remains our “greatest challenge.”56
Military-to-Military Contacts Since 1993
The scope of this record of mil-to-mil contacts focuses on senior-level visits,
strategic talks, functional exchanges, agreements, commissions, and training or
exercises.  This compiled chronology does not provide a detailed list of all mil-to-mil
contacts (that also include confidence building measures, educational exchanges that
include visits by students at war colleges and the U.S. Capstone educational program
for new general/flag officers, the numerous port calls in Hong Kong that continued
after its hand-over from British to PRC control in July 1997, disaster relief missions,
multilateral conferences, “track two” discussions sponsored by former Defense
Secretary William Perry, etc.).  There is no security assistance, as U.S. sanctions
against arms sales have remained since 1989.  Sources include numerous official
statements, reports to Congress, documents, U.S. and PRC news stories, interviews,
and observations.  Specific dates are provided to the extent possible, while there are
instances in which just the month is reported.  Text boxes summarize major bilateral
tensions to provide context for the alternating periods of enthusiastic and skeptical
contacts.
1993
In July 1993, the Clinton Administration suspected that a PRC cargo ship, called
the Yinhe, was going to Iran with chemicals that could be used for chemical
weapons and sought to inspect its cargo.  In an unusual move, on August 9, China
first disclosed that it protested U.S. “harassment” and finally allowed U.S.
participation in a Saudi inspection of the ship’s cargo  on August 26, 1993.
Afterward, the State Department said that the suspected chemicals were not found
on the ship at that time.  The PRC has raised this Yinhe incident as a grievance
against the United States and the credibility of U.S. intelligence in particular.  (See
CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Background and Analysis, September 13, 1996.)
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On August 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on PRC
entities for proliferation of equipment for M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to
Pakistan, effectively denying the export of some satellites to China.  (See CRS
Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues.)
November 1-2 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Chas Freeman visited China, renewing mil-to-mil ties
for the first time since the Tiananmen Crackdown in June
1989.  Freeman met with General Liu Huaqing (a Vice
Chairman of the CMC), General Chi Haotian (Defense
Minister), Lieutenant General Xu Huizi (Deputy Chief of
General Staff), and Lieutenant General Huai Guomo (Vice
Chairman of the Commission of Science, Technology, and
Industry for National Defense, or COSTIND).
1994
January 17-21 Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, President of the National
Defense University (NDU), visited China to advance
professional military exchanges with the PLA’s NDU.
Cerjan visited the Nanjing Military Region and saw the 179th
Infantry Division.
March 11-14 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner visited
China, along with Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
July 6-8 Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral
Charles Larson, visited China and held talks with PLA
Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Xu Huizi.
August 15-18 The Director of the PRC’s National Bureau of Surveying and
Mapping (NBSM) visited the United States and signed an
agreement for a cooperative program with the Defense
Mapping Agency, the predecessor of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA), regarding the global
positioning system (GPS).  The agreement refers to the
“Protocol for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
Surveying and Mapping Studies Concerning Scientific and
Technical Cooperation in the Application of Geodetic and
Geophysical Data to Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic
(MC&G) Programs.”
August 15-25 PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Xu Huizi,
visited the United States and met with Defense Secretary
William Perry and General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, DC, and PACOM
Commander, Admiral Richard Macke, in Hawaii.
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September 7-29 In a POW/MIA operation, a U.S. Army team traveled to
Tibet with PLA support to recover the remains of two U.S.
airmen whose C-87 cargo plane crashed into a glacier at
14,000 feet in Tibet on December 31, 1944, during a flight
over the “hump” back to India from Kunming, China, in
World War II.
September 19-24 Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Merrill McPeak,
visited China and met with PLA Air Force Commander,
General Cao Shuangming.
October 16-19 Secretary of Defense William Perry visited China and met
with Generals Liu Huaqing (CMC Vice Chairman) and Chi
Haotian (Defense Minister).  On October 17, Perry and PLA
General Ding Henggao, Director of COSTIND, conducted
the first meeting of the newly-established U.S.-China Joint
Defense Conversion Commission.  They signed the “U.S.-
China Joint Defense Conversion Commission: Minutes of the
First Meeting, Beijing, October 17, 1994.”
In a three-day confrontation in the Yellow Sea on October 27-29, 1994, the U.S.
aircraft carrier battle group led by the USS Kitty Hawk discovered and tracked a
Han-class nuclear attack submarine of the PLA Navy.  In response, the PLA Air
Force sent fighters toward the U.S. aircraft tracking the submarine.  Although no
shots were fired by either side, China followed up the incident with a warning,
issued to the U.S. Naval Attache over dinner in Beijing, that the PLA would open
fire in a future incident.  (See CRS Report RL31183, China’s Maritime Territorial
Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, November 12, 2001.)
November 5-10 The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
Lieutenant General James Clapper, visited China.  He met
with the GSD’s Second Department (Intelligence) and the
affiliated China Institute for International Strategic Studies
(CIISS), saw the 179th Division in Nanjing, and received a
briefing on tactical intelligence.
November 11-15 The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
David Hinson, and the Defense Department’s Executive
Director of the Policy Board on Federal Aviation, Frank
Colson, visited China to formulate the “U.S.-China 8-Step
Civil-Military Air Traffic Control Cooperative Plan” agreed
to during establishment of the Joint Defense Conversion
Commission.
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November 19-26 The PLA sent a delegation of new general and flag officers
to the United States (similar to the U.S. Capstone program),
led by Lieutenant General Ma Weizhi, Vice President of the
NDU.  They visited: Fort Irwin (including the National
Training Center); Nellis Air Force Base (and observed a Red
Flag exercise); Washington, DC (for meetings at NDU and
Pentagon, including with the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens); and Norfolk Naval
Base (and toured an aircraft carrier).
December A delegation from NIMA visited China to sign a GPS survey
plan and discuss provision of PRC data on gravity for a
NIMA/NASA project on gravity modeling and establishment
of a GPS tracking station near Beijing.
December 10-13 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Requirements Ted Warner visited China to conduct briefings
on the U.S. defense strategy and budget as part of a defense
transparency initiative, based on an agreement between




PLA Major General Wen Guangchun, Assistant to the
Director of the General Logistics Department (GLD), visited
the United States at the invitation of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.  The
U.S. military provided briefings on logistics doctrine and
systems and allowed the PLA visitors to observe U.S.
military logistics activities and installations.
February 6-10 U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Operations, Lieutenant General Joseph Ralston, led a
delegation of officials from the Department of Defense,
Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of
Commerce to visit China.  They studied the PRC’s civil-
military air traffic control system and discussed future
cooperation.
CRS-27
In early February 1995, the PLA Navy occupied Mischief Reef in the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea, although Mischief Reef is about 150 miles west
of the Philippines’ island of Palawan but over 620 miles southeast of China’s
Hainan island off its southern coast.  China seized a claim to territory in the South
China Sea against a country other than Vietnam for the first time and challenged
the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.  Some Members of Congress introduced
resolutions urging U.S. support for peace and stability.  Three months later, on
May 10, 1995, the Clinton Administration issued a statement opposing the use or
threat of force to resolve the competing claims, without naming China.  (See CRS
Report RL31183, China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S.
Interests, November 12, 2001.)
February 24-
March 7
President of the PLA’s NDU, Lieutenant General Zhu Dunfa,
visited the United States.  Zhu visited West Point in New
York; U.S. NDU and Pentagon in Washington, DC; Maxwell
Air Force Base in Alabama; Naval Air Station North Island,
Marine Recruit Depot, and Camp Pendleton Marine Corps
Base in California; and PACOM in Hawaii.
March 22-24 The USS Bunker Hill (Aegis-equipped, Ticonderoga-class
cruiser) visited Qingdao, in the first U.S. Navy ship visit to
China since 1989.  The senior officer aboard, Rear Admiral
Bernard Smith, Commander of Carrier Group Five, met with
Vice Admiral Wang Jiying, Commander of the PLA Navy
(PLAN)’s North Sea Fleet.
March 25-28 A Deputy Director of COSTIND, Lieutenant General Huai
Guomo, visited Washington to meet with officials at the
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, and
people in the private sector to discuss possible projects for
the Joint Defense Conversion Commission.
March 26-April 2 Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, PLA Assistant Chief of
General Staff (with the portfolio of military intelligence),
visited the United States, reciprocating for Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Ted
Warner’s visit to Beijing in December 1994.  Xiong provided
briefings on the PLA’s defense strategy and budget, and the
composition of the armed forces, and received briefings on
U.S. national and global information infrastructures.
March 28-April 4 A delegation from the PRC’s National Bureau of Surveying
and Mapping visited the United States to hold discussions
with NIMA and release PRC gravity data for analysis.
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April 19 Vice Minister of the PRC’s General Administration of Civil
Aviation (CAAC) Bao Peide visited the United States to
meet with the Federal Aviation Administration and U.S.
companies.  U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
and Operations, Lieutenant General Ralph Eberhart, briefed
the PRC delegation on U.S. Air Force air traffic control
programs.
April 25-30 PACOM Commander, Admiral Richard Macke, visited
China, hosted by PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff,
General Xu Huizi.
May 17-22 PLA Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Yu Zhenwu,
visited the United States, hosted by the U.S. Air Force Chief
of Staff.  Originally scheduled to last until May 27, the PLA
terminated the visit on May 22 to protest the Clinton
Administration’s decision to grant a visa to Taiwan’s
President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell
University.
On July 21-28, 1995, after the Clinton Administration allowed Taiwan’s President
Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit to give a speech at Cornell University on June
9, the PLA launched M-9 short-range ballistic missiles in “test-firings” toward
target areas in the East China Sea.  The PLA held other exercises directed against
Taiwan until November.
On August 3, 1995, China expelled two U.S. Air Force attaches stationed in Hong
Kong who traveled to China and were detained.  China accused them of collecting
military intelligence in restricted military areas along the southeastern coast.
August 31-
September 2
PLA Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region,
Lieutenant General Li Xilin, visited Hawaii to participate in
a ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of victory
in the Pacific in World War II.  Li met with Secretary of
Defense Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Shalikashvili, and PACOM Commander, Admiral Macke.
September 7-16 Two NIMA teams visited China to establish GPS satellite
tracking stations and discuss plans for a GPS survey in China
in 1996.
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October 15-25 Lieutenant General (USAF) Ervin Rokke, President of the
NDU, visited China and held talks with Lieutenant General
Xing Shizhong, President of the PLA’s NDU, about
professional military educational exchanges.  The PLA
arranged for Rokke to visit the 196th Infantry Division under
the Beijing Military Region, the Satellite Control Center in
Xian (the first U.S. access), the Guilin Army Academy in
Guilin, and the Guangzhou Military Region.
November 14-18 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Joseph Nye visited Beijing and met with General Chi
Haotian.  Nye said that “nobody knows” what the United
States would do if the PLA attacked Taiwan.
1996
On January 19, 1996, China expelled the U.S. Assistant Air Force Attache and the
Japanese Air Force Attache, after detaining them while they were traveling in
southern China.
January 20-27 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations of the
U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant General Ralph Eberhart, visited
China as head of a delegation of representatives of the
Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration,




The USS Fort McHenry, a dock-landing ship, visited
Shanghai, under the command of Rear Admiral Walter
Doran.
February 6 Visiting PRC Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe at
the Pentagon.
March 7 Secretary of Defense Perry, along with National Security
Advisor Anthony Lake, attended a dinner meeting hosted by
Secretary of State Christopher at the State Department for
PRC Foreign Affairs Office Director Liu Huaqiu.  Perry
warned Liu that there would be “grave consequences” should
the PLA attack Taiwan.
On March 8-15, 1996, the PLA launched four M-9 short-range ballistic missiles
into waters close to the two ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung in Taiwan.  Leading
up to Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election on March 23, the PLA
conducted live fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait on March 12-25.
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On March 10-11, 1996, the United States announced that it would deploy two
aircraft carriers, the USS Independence and USS Nimitz, to waters near the east
coast of Taiwan.
March 9-17 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Stephen
Joseph visited China to advance bilateral military medical
relations.  Joseph and a Deputy Director of the GLD,
Lieutenant General Zhou Youliang, signed a “Memorandum
of Medical Exchange and Cooperation.”
April 5-13 Geodesy and geophysical staff from NIMA visited China to
hold discussions with the PRC’s National Bureau of
Surveying and Mapping.
May 4-20 A geodesy and geophysical survey team from NIMA visited
China to perform a cooperative GPS survey.
June 25-28 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe
visited China.
July 11-August 31 The PRC’s National Bureau of Surveying and Mapping
visited the United States to hold discussions with NIMA on
cooperative projects and computation of results for the GPS
China survey.
September 2-8 PACOM Commander, Admiral Joseph Prueher, visited
China, hosted by a PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff,
Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai.
September 10 The Office for Defense Procurement/Foreign Contracting of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology hosted Vice Chairman of the State Planning
Commission She Jianming at the Pentagon and provided a
briefing on the Defense Department’s procurement system.
September 16-18 NIMA participated in the 9th meeting of the U.S.-PRC Joint
Working Group for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
Surveying in Beijing.
September 17-29 A Deputy Director of the GLD, Lieutenant General Zhou
Youliang, visited the United States to advance bilateral
military medical relations, as the reciprocal visit for that of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to
China in March 1996.  Both sides discussed cooperation
between military hospitals, such as PLA 301 Hospital and
Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
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September 17 At the Pentagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with the vice
president of the Chinese Institute for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), which is associated with the
Ministry of State Security.
September 21-27 A team from NIMA visited China to perform maintenance on
the GPS tracking station and discuss cooperative plans on
gravity data.
October 4-17 Lieutenant General Xing Shizhong, President of the PLA’s
NDU, visited the United States.  He and Lieutenant General
Ervin Rokke, President of the U.S. NDU, signed a
“Memorandum on Cooperation and Reciprocal Relations”
between the two NDUs.  They agreed to undertake reciprocal
interaction on a broad range of issues relevant to professional
military education, including military art, the evolution of
strategy and doctrine, strategic assessment, the impact of
technological advance on the nature of warfare, library
science, and publishing.
October 11-17 The Surgeon General of the U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant
General Edgar Anderson, led a U.S. military medical
delegation to participate in the XXXI International Congress
on Military Medicine held in Beijing.
October 20 At the Pentagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with a
delegation from the Chinese Institute of International
Strategic Studies (CIISS), which is associated with the PLA.
November 11-19 The Director of DIA, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes,
visited China.
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December 5-18 General Chi Haotian, a Vice Chairman of the CMC and
Minister of Defense, visited the United States, to reciprocate
for Defense Secretary Perry’s visit to China in October 1994.
Perry announced that General Chi’s visit allowed for
discussions of global and regional security issues as well as
the future of mil-to-mil relations.  While in Washington,
General Chi met with President William Clinton.  A
controversy arose when General Chi gave a speech at NDU
at Fort McNair and defended the PLA’s crackdown on
peaceful demonstrators in Beijing in 1989 (during which he
was the PLA’s Chief of General Staff) and claimed —
apparently in a narrow sense — that no one died in
Tiananmen Square itself.  DOD provided a draft proposal for
a bilateral  military maritime cooperative agreement.  The
two sides agreed to continue U.S. port calls to Hong Kong
after its hand-over from British to PRC control on July 1,
1997; to allow PLA ship visits to Hawaii and the U.S. west
coast; to institutionalize Defense Consultative Talks; to hold
senior-level visits; and to allow U.S. repatriation of the
remains of the crew of a B-24 bomber that crashed in
southern China in World War II (after General Chi presented
dog tags found at the crash site).  After Washington, Perry
arranged for General Chi to travel to Air Force and Navy
facilities in Norfolk, Virginia; the Air University at Maxwell
Air Force Base in Alabama; Army units at Fort Hood, Texas;
the Cooperative Monitoring Center at the Sandia National
Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico (for discussion of
technology that could be used to verify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty); and PACOM in Hawaii headed by Admiral
Joseph Prueher.
1997
January 13-17 A Defense POW/MIA team went to Maoer Mountain in
Guangxi province (in southern China) to recover the remains
of a “Flying Tigers” crew whose B-24 bomber crashed into
the mountain in 1944 after bombing Japanese forces near
Taiwan during World War II.
January 15 At the Pentagon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Frank Kramer met with Wang
Daohan, president of the PRC’s Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).
February 21-
March 6
Lieutenant General Kui Fulin, a Deputy Chief of General
Staff, visited the United States, hosted by the Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army, General Dennis Reimer.  General Kui
visited the Pentagon, West Point in New York, U.S. Army
Forces Command in Georgia, Fort Benning in Georgia, and
PACOM in Hawaii.
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February 24-27 The Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Environmental Security, Gary Vest, visited Beijing to
participate in the 1997 China Environment Forum and met
with PLA leaders to discuss environmental security issues.
March 9-25 PLA Naval ships (the Luhu-class destroyer Harbin, the Luda-
class destroyer Zhuhai, and the oiler Nanchang) visited Pearl
Harbor, HI (March 9-13) and San Diego, CA (March 21-25),
in the PLA Navy (PLAN)’s second ship visit to Pearl Harbor
and first port call to the U.S. west coast.  As part of the
occasion, Vice Admiral He Pengfei (a PLAN Deputy
Commander) and Vice Admiral Wang Yongguo (PLAN
South Sea Fleet Commander) visited the United States.
April Major General John Cowlings, Commandant of the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces of the U.S. NDU, visited China.
May 12-15 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
Shalikashvili, visited China, hosted by the PLA’s Chief of
General Staff, General Fu Quanyou.  On May 14, 1997,
Shalikashvili gave a speech at the PLA’s NDU, in which he
called for mil-to-mil contacts that are deeper, more frequent,
more balanced, and more developed, in order to decrease
suspicion, advance cooperation, and prevent miscalculations
in a crisis.  He called for a more equal exchange of
information, confidence building measures (CBMs), military
academic and functional exchanges, the PLA’s participation
in multinational military activities, and a regular dialogue
between senior military leaders.  He also urged the
completion of the military maritime and air cooperative
agreement.  However, Shalikashvili reportedly got only a
limited view of the PLA during a visit to the 15th Airborne
Army (in Hubei province).
On May 21, 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on PRC entities
and citizens for chemical weapons proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report
RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:
Policy Issues.)
July Lieutenant General Xu Qiliang, Chief of Staff of the PLA Air
Force, led an education and training delegation to the United
States. 
July Lieutenant General Wu Quanxu, a Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the PLA, visited PACOM in Hawaii.
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August 5-13 General Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of General Staff, visited the
United States.  Secretary of Defense William Cohen and
General John Shalikashvili  welcomed Fu at the Pentagon
with a 19-gun salute.  General Fu also visited West Point in
New York, Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Norfolk Naval
Base in Virginia, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, and
PACOM in Hawaii.  General Fu boarded a U.S. nuclear
attack submarine and the USS Blue Ridge, the 7th Fleet’s
amphibious command ship.
September 11-15 An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS John S. McCain,
visited Qingdao.  As part of the occasion, Commander of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Archie Clemins, visited China
and met with the Commander of the PLAN North Sea Fleet,
Rear Admiral Zhang Dingfa.
September 14-21 The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, Major
General Walter Huffman, visited China, including the Jinan
Military Region, to discuss military law.
September 22-26 The U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer,
visited China, along with the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy.  They
met with Generals Chi Haotian and Fu Quanyou, and visited
the 6th Tank Division and an engineering regiment in the
Beijing Military Region, and an artillery unit in the Nanjing
Military Region.  They also paid the first U.S. visit to the
command headquarters of the Guangzhou Military Region.
October 6 The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, visited
China and met with General Chi Haotian, General Fu
Quanyou, and Admiral Shi Yunsheng, PLAN Commander.
October Lieutenant General He Daoquan, a Vice President of the
PLA’s NDU, led a delegation to the United States (similar to
the U.S. Capstone program for new general/flag officers).
October 29 Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of
China, CMC Chairman, and PRC President, visited
Washington for a summit with President Clinton.  Among a
number of agreements, they agreed to strengthen mil-to-mil
contacts to minimize miscalculations, advance transparency,
and strengthen communication.  In the “U.S.-PRC Joint
Statement,” the Administration reiterated that it adheres to
the “one China” policy and the principles in the three U.S.-
PRC Joint Communiques, but did not mention the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), the law governing U.S. relations with
Taiwan (including security assistance for its self-defense).
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November Continuing a POW/MIA mission, a team from the U.S.
Army’s Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI)
returned to Maoer Mountain in southern China to recover
additional remains from a B-24 bomber that crashed in 1944.
December 8-19 PACOM Commander, Admiral Joseph Prueher, visited
China and met with PRC leader Jiang Zemin, General Zhang
Wannian, General Chi Haotian, General Fu Quanyou, among
others.  Prueher enjoyed what the PLA considered the
broadest access ever granted to a visiting military official
during one trip.  Prueher visited the Jinan, Nanjing, and
Guangzhou Military Regions.  He visited the PLA Air Force
Flight Test and Development Center in Cangzhou in Jinan,
where he saw a static display of aircraft, after poor weather
conditions apparently precluded a flight demonstration of F-7
and F-8 fighters.  Prueher visited the 179th Infantry Division
at the Nanjing Military Region, watched a live-fire assault
demonstration, and toured a farm run by the PLA.  At
Zhanjiang, Prueher visited the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet,
where he observed a demonstration by the 1st Marine
Brigade, saw a new air-cushioned landing craft, and toured
the destroyer Zhuhai.  Prueher stressed future PLA-PACOM
cooperation in peacekeeping and disaster relief training.
December 11-12 Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, a PLA Deputy Chief of
General Staff, visited the Pentagon to hold the first U.S.-PRC
Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) with Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe.  During their summit
in October, Presidents Clinton and Jiang had agreed to hold
regular rounds of DCT.  The two sides initialed the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (“Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of National Defense of the
People’s Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation
Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety”).
December The U.S. Air Force and Coast Guard conducted search-and-
rescue exercises in Hong Kong (with its Civil Aviation
Department), after the British hand-over of Hong Kong to
PRC sovereignty in July 1997.  At a news briefing on July 7,
1998, the Pentagon said that the PLA observed this exercise.
December A PLA training delegation visited the U.S. Army’s premier
National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin in California.
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1998
January 17-21 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, accompanied by
Admiral Prueher (PACOM Commander), visited China.
Cohen signed the “Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA),” intended to set up a framework for
dialogue on how to minimize the chances of miscalculation
and accidents between U.S. and PLA forces operating at sea
or in the air.  He said that Jiang Zemin and General Chi
Haotian promised that China did not plan to transfer to Iran
additional anti-ship cruise missiles.  The PLA allowed Cohen
to be the first Western official to visit the Beijing Military
Region’s Air Defense Command Center, a step that Cohen
called important and symbolic.  However, the PLA denied
Cohen’s request to visit China’s National Command Center.
Cohen gave a speech at the PLA’s Academy of Military
Science (AMS) and called for expanded mil-to-mil contacts
on: (1) defense environmental issues; (2) strategic nuclear
missile forces; (3) POW/MIA affairs; and (4) humanitarian
operations (as part of shifting contacts from those that build
confidence to those that advance real-world cooperation).
Cohen asked the PLA to allow U.S. access to PRC archives
to resolve questions about the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs in the
Korean War who might have been in prison camps in China.
February 16-20 For the first time, the PLA attended the Pacific Area Special
Operations Conference (PASOC) in Hawaii.
March 14-24 A U.S. Army training delegation from the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) based at Fort Monroe, VA,
visited China.  The Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Major
General Leroy Goff and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Major General David Ohle, led the delegation.
They saw the PLA’s training base in Anhui province under
the Nanjing Military Region (similar to the NTC).
March 29-
April 10
General Wang Ke, Director of the GLD of the PLA, visited
the United States, hosted by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisitions and Technology.  General Wang visited
West Point in New York, Aberdeen Proving Ground in
Maryland, the Pentagon, Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center
in Georgia, the Defense Logistics Agency’s Defense Supply
Center in Richmond, the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft
carrier at Naval Air Station North Island (San Diego) in
California, and PACOM in Hawaii.  At the Pentagon, DOD
provided briefings on: organizations for the DOD Logistics
Systems, Logistics Modernization Initiatives, Joint
Logistics/Focused Logistics, DOD Outsourcing Process and
Experiences, DOD Military Retirement Systems, and the
Army’s Integrated Training Area Management Program.
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In April 1998, the New York Times disclosed that the Justice Department had
begun a criminal investigation into whether U.S. satellite manufacturers, Loral
Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corporation, violated
export control laws.  They allegedly provided expertise that China could use to
improve its ballistic missiles, when the companies shared their technical findings
with China on the cause of a PRC rocket’s explosion while launching a U.S.-origin
satellite in February 1996.  The House set up the “Cox Committee” to investigate
the allegations of corporate misconduct and policy mistakes.  The Senate set up a
task force.  Congress also passed legislation to tighten control over satellite exports
to China.  (See CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers
Under U.S. Satellite Export Policy — Actions and Chronology, and CRS Report
RL30220, China’s Technology Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s Report — Findings,
Issues, and Recommendations.)
April 6-10 The PLA went to PACOM’s Military Operations and Law
Conference, organized by the Judge Advocate’s office.
April 29-30 The Defense Department and PLA held pre-talks on the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA).
May 3-5 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Franklin Kramer visited Beijing.
May 4-9 The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Michael
Ryan, visited China.  The PLA Air Force gave him a tour of
Foshan Air Base and allowed him to fly an F-7 fighter and
view an air- refuelable version of an FA-2.  However, the
PLA Air Force denied General Ryan’s requests to fly in a
SU-27 fighter, to see integration of the SU-27s into the units,
and to see progress on development of the F-10 fighter.
May A PLA delegation on military law visited the United States.
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June 25-July 3 President Clinton traveled to China to hold his second
summit with Jiang Zemin, following the summit in October
1997.  They announced that the United States and China:
have a direct presidential “hot line” that was set up in May
1998; will not target strategic nuclear weapons under their
respective control at each other; will hold the first meeting
under the MMCA; will observe exercises of the other based
on reciprocity (meaning the PLA would also issue invitations
to U.S. observers); will cooperate in humanitarian assistance;
and will cooperate in military environmental security.
However, China only agreed to study whether to join the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and did not
agree to open archives to allow U.S. research on POW/MIAs
from the Korean War.  In Shanghai on June 30, Clinton
stated the so-called “Three Noes” of non-support for
Taiwan’s independence; non-support for two Chinas or one
China and one Taiwan; and non-support for Taiwan’s
membership in international bodies requiring statehood.
July 9-24 At U.S. invitation, the PLA sent two observers to Cope
Thunder 98-4, a multinational air exercise held at Eielson
and Elmendorf Air Force Bases in Alaska.  The air forces of
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and
Singapore participated in the exercise, which was designed
to sharpen air combat skills, exchange air operational tactics,
and promote closer relations.  Pilots flew a variety of aircraft
in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat missions, and combat
support missions against a realistic set of threats.  Russia,
Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines also sent
military observers.
July 14-15 In Beijing, the DOD and PLA held the first plenary meeting
under the MMCA.
July 15-20 At U.S. invitation, the PLA Navy sent two observers to
RIMPAC 1998, the first time the PLA observed this
multinational naval exercise based in Hawaii in the Pacific
Ocean.  The naval forces of the United States, Australia,
Canada, Chile, Japan, and South Korea participated in the
exercise, which was designed to enhance their tactical
capabilities in maritime operations.  During part of the
exercise, the U.S. Navy hosted the PLA Navy’s
representatives on board the USS Coronado (the 3rd Fleet’s
command ship), the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, the
USS Paul Hamilton (an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer), and
the USS Antietam (a Ticonderoga-class cruiser).
July 20-26 PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Qian
Shugen, visited the United States.
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July A PRC civilian and military delegation visited the United
States, including Pensacola, FL, to discuss air traffic control
with the Federal Aviation Administration, Departments of
Commerce and Defense, and the U.S. Air Force.
August 2-6 The command ship of the 7th Fleet, USS Blue Ridge, and a
destroyer, USS John S. McCain, visited Qingdao.  As part of
the occasion, Vice Admiral Robert Natter, Commander of the
7th Fleet, visited and met with Vice Admiral Shi Yunsheng,
PLAN Commander, and Vice Admiral He Pengfei, a PLAN
Deputy Commander.
August 16-23 The Commandant of the Army War College, Major General
Robert Scales, and the U.S. Army’s Chief of Military
History, Brigadier General John Mountcastle, visited Beijing,
Tianjin, and Nanjing, and discussed the PLA’s historical
campaigns.
September 12-20 NDU President, Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat, visited
China, including Hong Kong, Beijing, Xian, and Dalian.
CRS-40
September 14-24 General Zhang Wannian, a Vice Chairman of the CMC and
highest-ranking PLA officer, visited the United States.
However, with General Shalikashvili’s disappointment with
the lack of transparency and reciprocity shown to him by the
PLA during his trip to China in May 1997, Secretary of
Defense William Cohen invoked the “Shali Prohibitions” in
restricting General Zhang’s exposure to the U.S. military
during his visits to the Pentagon, Fort Benning in Georgia,
and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. President Clinton met
with General Zhang at the White House.  At a news
conference on September 15, 1998, Secretary Cohen
announced that he and General Zhang signed an agreement
on cooperation in environmental security (“Joint Statement
on the Exchange of Information by the United States
Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National
Defense on Military Environmental Protection”); discussed
weapons proliferation and international terrorism; and agreed
to conduct sand table exercises on disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance in 1999, to have a ship visit by the
PLA Navy in 1999, to conduct a seminar on maritime search
and rescue, to allow each other to observe specific military
exercises, to exchange military students, and to allow a PRC
delegation to visit the Cooperative Monitoring Center at the
Sandia National Laboratory.  However, Cohen did not
announce any progress in following up on U.S. concerns
about Korean War POW/MIA cases, non-targeting of
strategic nuclear forces (involving the Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the PLA’s Second Artillery), PLA threats
against Taiwan, or weapons nonproliferation.  General Zhang
cited President Clinton’s statements in China in June about
the U.S. “one China” policy and the “Three Noes,” while
Secretary Cohen stressed peaceful resolution and said that
Clinton reiterated commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act.
October 20-21 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe
visited Beijing for the second DCT and met with Generals
Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian (CMC Vice Chairmen), and
Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai.  They discussed global
and regional security issues, defense relations in the Asia-
Pacific region, military strategy and modernization, and mil-
to-mil contacts in 1999 (“Gameplan for 1999 U.S.-Sino
Defense Exchanges”).  The PLA raised objections to the U.S.
plan to field theater missile defense systems.
November 1 Secretary of Defense Cohen visited Hong Kong (on his way
to South Korea and Japan) to underscore the U.S.
determination to continue its defense involvement there,
including ship visits, after its hand-over to PRC rule.
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November 9-14 PACOM Commander, Admiral Joseph Prueher, visited
China, along with Lieutenant General Carl Fulford
(Commander of U.S. Marine Forces Pacific) and Major
General Earl Hailston (Director for Strategic Planning and
Policy).  They met with General Zhang Wannian (a CMC
Vice Chairman), General Fu Quanyou (Chief of General
Staff), General Wang Ke (GLD Director), and Lieutenant
General Xiong Guangkai (a Deputy Chief of General Staff).
The PLA arranged for visits to the 47th Group Army based
near Xian and a subordinate air defense brigade, in granting
the first foreign military access to these two commands.
Admiral Prueher also visited the PLA Air Force’s 28th Air
Attack Division in Hangzhou and observed ordnance loading
of A-5 bombers and a live-fire demonstration of an air-to-
ground attack by A-5s.  He then toured a Jiangwei-class
frigate of the PLA Navy in Shanghai.
December 1-4 U.S. and PLA military forces participated in an annual search
and rescue exercise (HK SAREX 98) held by Hong Kong’s
Civil Aviation Department.
December 4 PACOM Commander, Admiral Joseph Prueher, visited Hong
Kong and met with Major Generals Zhou Borong and Xiong
Ziren, Deputy Commander and Political Commissar of PLA
forces there.
December 4-8 A U.S. Navy frigate, the USS Vandegrift, visited Shanghai.
As part of the port call, Rear Admiral Harry Highfill,
Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet’s Amphibious Force, met
with Rear Admiral Hou Yuexi, Commander of the Shanghai
Naval Base.  The PLAN arranged for Admiral Highfill to
tour the PLAN’s Jiangwei-class frigate, the Anqing.
December 9-11 Military maritime consultative talks (under the MMCA)
between the U.S. Navy and PLAN took place near San
Diego, CA.  The PLAN delegation, led by Captain Shen Hao,
Director of the PLAN Operations Department, stayed at the
Naval Amphibious Base at Coronado and toured a U.S.
destroyer (USS Stetham) and the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Ship
Handling Simulator at the San Diego Naval Station.
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1999
At the end of 1998 and start of 1999, the New York Times and Wall Street Journal
disclosed that the Cox Committee was looking at the Clinton Administration’s
investigation that began in 1995 into whether China obtained secret U.S. nuclear
weapons data, in addition to missile technology associated with satellite launches.
On April 21, 1999, the Director of Central Intelligence confirmed that “China
obtained by espionage classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that probably
accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons.”  However, it was
uncertain whether China obtained documentation or blueprints, and China also
benefitted from information obtained from a wide variety of sources, including
open sources (unclassified information) and China’s own efforts.  (See CRS
Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets,
and CRS Report RL30220, China’s Technology Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s
Report — Findings, Issues, and Recommendations.)
January 19-26 The Director of the Defense POW/MIA Office, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Jones, visited China to
seek the PLA’s cooperation in accounting for U.S.
POW/MIAs from the Korean War, specifically seeking U.S.
access to PLA archives, veterans, and a film with information
about POW camps in China.
March President of the PLA’s NDU, General Xing Shizhong, visited
Washington and gave a speech at the U.S. NDU at Fort
McNair on March 18, 1999.  The Pentagon arranged for
General Xing to visit Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia, receive
a briefing on the U.S. Navy’s “Network Centric Warfare” in
Rhode Island, visit Fort Hood in Texas and receive a briefing
on Task Force XXI (an experimental warfighting force in the
Army), and see the Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force
Base in Nevada.  However, the Defense Department denied
the PLA delegation’s access to observe the Red Flag combat
training exercise at Nellis Air Force Base.
In April 1999, under congressional pressure, the Clinton Administration approved
a potential sale of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan.  (See CRS Report
RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
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On May 7, 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces bombed the PRC’s embassy in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia, having mistakenly targeted it as a military supply facility belonging
to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic whose Serbian forces attacked Kosovo.
Despite President Clinton’s apology, the PRC angrily suspended mil-to-mil
contacts, allowed protesters to attack violently U.S. diplomatic facilities in China,
and denied ship visits to Hong Kong by the U.S. Navy until September 1999.  In
July 1999, the United States agreed to pay $4.5 million in compensation for PRC
casualties.  In FY2001 legislation,  Congress appropriated $28 million to
compensate for damages to China’s embassy.
May A U.S. Navy working group under the MMCA visited
Qingdao to discuss international standards of communication
at sea.
May 9-20 A PRC delegation that included PLA officers visited the
United States to discuss air traffic control.  On May 18, 1999,
they visited Edwards Air Force Base in California and
received a briefing on daily planning, integration, and control
of civilian and military operations.
In May 1999, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999
(P.L. 105-261), Secretary of Defense Cohen submitted the unclassified version of
the “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the
Asia-Pacific Region.”  Congress required a report on theater missile defense
systems that could be transferred to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which the
conference report called “key regional allies.”  (See CRS Report RL30379, Missile
Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the Defense
Department Report to Congress.)
On July 9, 1999, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui characterized the cross-strait
relationship as “special state-to-state ties,” sparking military tensions with the
PLA.  The Clinton Administration responded that Lee’s statement was not helpful
and reaffirmed the “one China” policy.  The PLA flew fighters across the “center”
line of the Taiwan Strait and conducted exercises along the coast opposite Taiwan.
In early September, CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian personally
directed a major, joint landing exercise.  A tragic earthquake in Taiwan on
September 21 defused the tensions.  (See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements From Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei.)
November 19-21 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Affairs Kurt Campbell and Major General (USMC) Michael
Hagee, PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and Policy
(J5), visited Beijing to discuss resuming military contacts.
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December 1-4 U.S. military and PLA forces participated in Hong Kong’s
annual search and rescue exercise.
2000
January 24-26 Resuming contacts, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai (a
Deputy Chief of General Staff) visited Washington to hold
the third DCT with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Slocombe.  They discussed the program for mil-to-mil
contacts in 2000, international security issues, U.S. strategy
in Asia, the PLA’s missile buildup, Taiwan, missile defense,
weapons proliferation, and North Korea.  Xiong met with
Secretary of Defense Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
General Henry Shelton, Deputy National Security Advisor
James Steinberg, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering,
and State Department Senior Advisor John Holum.
February 17-18 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe, Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston, and Deputy
National Security Advisor James Steinberg visited Beijing
(after visiting Tokyo) for a strategic dialogue.  They met with
CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian, who raised
the Taiwan issue, including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
On February 21, 2000, ahead of Taiwan’s presidential election on March 18, 2000,
the PRC issued its second Taiwan White Paper, which declared a threat to use
force against Taiwan if a serious development leads to Taiwan’s separation from
China in any name, if there is foreign invasion or occupation of Taiwan, or if
Taiwan’s government indefinitely refuses to negotiate national unification (called
the “Three Ifs”).  Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe, who was just in Beijing
but was given no indication that the PRC would issue the White Paper and the
threat, responded forcefully on February 22 by warning that China would face
“incalculable consequences” if it used force against Taiwan.  (See CRS Report
RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)
February 27-
March 2
PACOM Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair, visited China
and discussed tensions over Taiwan with Chief of General
Staff, General Fu Quanyou, and General Chi Haotian.
March 10-12 Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Hong Kong and
discussed issues such as port calls by the U.S. Navy and the
prevention of trans-shipments of advanced U.S. technology
to mainland China.
CRS-45
March 27-29 A working group under the MMCA held a planning meeting
in China.
April 14-22 PLAN Commander, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, visited the
United States, coinciding with an annual round of U.S.-
Taiwan arms sales talks in Washington.  Admiral Shi met
with Secretary of Defense Cohen, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Jay Johnson.
In April 2000, during a round of annual arms sales talks, the Clinton
Administration approved  a request from Taiwan’s military to purchase AIM-120
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs).  (See CRS Report
RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
May 28-June 3 PACOM in Hawaii hosted the second plenary meeting under
the MMCA.  PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and
Policy (J5), Major General Michael Hagee (USMC), and the
PLA’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Wang Yucheng,
led the proceedings.  They reviewed a mutually-produced
document, “A Study on Sino-U.S. Maritime Navigational
Safety, Including Communications.”
June 13-14 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Frank Kramer visited Beijing and met with Major
General Zhan Maohai, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai,
and General Chi Haotian to plan Secretary of Defense
Cohen’s visit to China.
June 13-21 Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy (West Point),
Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, visited China.  He met
with General Chi Haotian and visited the PLA’s Armored
Force Engineering Academy, where he was the first
American to have access to a PLA Type-96 main battle tank.
June 18-23 Nanjing Military Region Commander Liang Guanglie led a
PLA delegation to visit PACOM in Hawaii and met with
Admiral Dennis Blair.
On July 10, 2000, responding to objections from the Clinton Administration and
Congress, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak told PRC ruler Jiang Zemin in a
letter that Israel canceled the nearly completed sale of the Phalcon airborne early
warning system to the PLA.  Prime Minister Barak informed President Clinton the
next day during peace talks at Camp David, MD.  (See CRS Report RL30700,
China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis.)
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July 11-15 Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Beijing and
Shanghai.  Cohen met with President Jiang Zemin and
Generals Chi Haotian, Zhang Wannian, and Fu Quanyou.
Cohen did not visit any PLA bases.  Cohen referred to the
promise made by PRC President Jiang Zemin during Cohen’s
previous visit to China in January 1998 and said that the PRC
has abided by that agreement not to ship cruise missiles to
Iran.  Secretary Cohen and General Chi signed an
“Agreement on the Exchange of Environmental Protection
Research and Development Information” and discussed the
need for cross-strait dialogue, weapons nonproliferation, and
regional stability.  The PRC objected to U.S. plans for
missile defense and pressure on Israel to cancel the sale of
the Phalcon airborne early warning system to the PLA,
concerning which Israel notified China just before Cohen’s
visit.  Cohen offered to fund PLA students at PACOM’s
APCSS in Honolulu.  Regarding Taiwan, General Chi said
that China would adopt a wait and see posture toward the
leader of Taiwan (referring to Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party, who won the presidential
election on March 18, 2000, bringing an end to the
Kuomintang (KMT)’s 55 years of rule in Taiwan).  Cohen
said that the Administration viewed Chen as offering hope
for cross-strait reconciliation.  In Shanghai, Cohen stepped
out of the narrow mil-to-mil context and met with Wang
Daohan, chairman of the PRC’s Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).  Cohen said that Chen
showed flexibility after becoming president and that there
was a window of opportunity for changes.
July 23-August 4 A delegation of the PLA Medical Department visited the
United States.
July 31-August 5 Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, visited Beijing and Qingdao in conjunction with the
visit of the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile cruiser USS




President of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences
(AMS), General Wang Zuxun, visited the United States.
There is no counter-part in the U.S. military with which to set
up reciprocal exchanges.  The AMS delegation included the
Directors of the Departments of Strategic Studies,
Operational and Tactical Studies, and Foreign Military
Studies.  They visited the Pentagon; Joint Forces Command
in Norfolk, Virginia; West Point in New York; Army War
College in Pennsylvania; Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe in Virginia; and
PACOM in Hawaii.  The Joint Forces Command provided
unclassified tours of its Joint Training Directorate (J-7) and
Joint Training Analysis Simulation Center, but not the Joint
Experimentation Battle Lab.
September 5-18 PLA Navy ships (the Luhu-class destroyer Qingdao and
Fuqing-class oiler Taicang) visited Pearl Harbor, HI
(September 5-8) and Naval Station Everett, near Seattle, WA
(September 14-18).  In Hawaii, the visitors toured the U.S.
destroyer USS O’Kane.
October For the first time, the PLA invited two U.S. military
personnel to attend the one-month International Security
Symposium at the NDU in Beijing.  (Subsequent invitations
dropped required fees.)
October 10-18 The PLA participated in a visit to the United States by a
Humanitarian Disaster Relief Sandtable Planning Team.
October 12-13 Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig visited Shanghai, in
the first visit by a U.S. Secretary of the Navy to China.  His
visit was curtailed because of the attack on the USS Cole in
a Yemeni harbor on October 12, 2000.
October 24-
November 4
CMC Member and Director of the General Political
Department (GPD) — the top political commissar, General
Yu Yongbo, visited the United States.  He was hosted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness Bernard Rostker.
General Yu’s delegation visited the Pentagon and met with
Secretary of Defense Cohen; West Point in New York;
Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC; Fort Jackson in
South Carolina; Patrick Air Force Base in Florida; and
PACOM in Hawaii.
November 2-6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry
Shelton, visited China, at the invitation of PLA Chief of
General Staff, General Fu Quanyou.  The PLA allowed
General Shelton to observe a brigade exercising at the PLA’s
Combined Arms  Training Center in the Nanjing Military
Region.  Shelton stressed the peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan question.
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November 2-12 A Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy, Rear Admiral
Zhang Zhannan, led a delegation from the Naval Command
Academy (in Nanjing) to visit Newport News, RI (Naval War
College); Washington, DC (including a meeting with the
Secretary of the Navy); Monterey, CA (Naval Post-Graduate
School); and Honolulu, HI (Pacific Command, including a
tour aboard an Aegis-equipped cruiser).
November 12-19 A PLA NDU delegation (similar to the U.S. Capstone
program) visited the United States.
November 28-
December 2
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe
visited Beijing to hold the fourth DCT with PLA Deputy
Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai.  Slocombe also met
with Generals Chi Haotian and Fu Quanyou and visited the
PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet in Qingdao.  The U.S. and PRC
sides discussed sharp differences over Taiwan and missile
defense, the program for mil-to-mil contacts in 2001, Korea,
and weapons proliferation.
December 3-9 A Working Group under the MMCA held its second meeting
(in China).
December 5-8 U.S. military and PLA forces participated in Hong Kong’s
annual search and rescue exercise and worked together in a
demonstration.
At the end of December 2000 in New York, PLA Senior Colonel Xu Junping, who
closely handled U.S.-PRC military relations, defected to the United States and
presented an intelligence loss for the PLA (reported Far Eastern Economic
Review, April 5, 2001).
2001
February 9-23 Major General Wang Shouye, Director of the GLD’s Capital
Construction and Barracks Department, led a delegation on
military environmental protection matters to the United
States.  They visited Washington, DC; Fort Pickett in
Virginia; Fort Bliss in Texas; the “boneyard” at Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona; Las Vegas in Nevada;
and PACOM in Hawaii.
March 14-17 PACOM Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair, visited Beijing,
Nanjing, and Shanghai.  PACOM said that Blair’s trip was
intended to discuss military activities and plans of the PLA
and PACOM, exchange views and enhance mutual
understanding, discuss Taiwan, and stress the inclusion rather
than exclusion of China in multilateral activities.
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March 23-26 The command ship of the 7th Fleet, the USS Blue Ridge,
made a port call to Shanghai.  In conjunction with the ship
visit, Vice Admiral James Metzger, Commander of the 7th
Fleet, visited Shanghai and met with Vice Admiral Zhao
Guojun, Commander of the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet.
On March 24, 2001, in the Yellow Sea near South Korea, a PLA Navy Jianghu III-
class frigate passed as close as 100 yards to a U.S. surveillance ship, the USS
Bowditch, and a PLA reconnaissance plane shadowed it.
On April 1, 2001, a PLA Navy F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3
reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea.  Upon surviving the collision, the
EP-3’s crew made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan island. The PLA
detained the 24 U.S. Navy personnel for 11 days.  Instead of acknowledging that
the PLA had started aggressive interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights in
December 2000 and apologizing for the accident, top PRC ruler Jiang Zemin
demanded an apology and compensation from the United States.  The United
States did not transport the damaged EP-3 out of China until July 3.  (See CRS
Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001:
Assessments and Policy Implications.)
On April 24, 2001, during arms sales talks in Washington, President Bush
approved a request from Taiwan’s military to purchase weapons systems including
diesel-electric submarines; P-3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft; and destroyers
(approving four Kidd-class destroyers).  The Bush Administration also decided to
brief Taiwan on the PAC-3 missile defense missile.  The next day, the President
said in an interview that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, he has an obligation to do
“whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”  (See CRS Report RL30957,
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
On June 14, 2001, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC entity for
chemical weapon proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
On September 1, 2001, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC
entity for missile proliferation in Pakistan, effectively denying satellite exports to
China.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
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September 14-15 The PLA and DOD held a special meeting under the MMCA
(in Guam) to discuss how to avoid clashes like the EP-3
collision incident.  The Commander of U.S. Naval Forces
Marianas, Rear Admiral Tom Fellin, led the U.S. delegation.
The issues for U.S. side were: principles of safe flight and
navigation for military activities conducted on the high seas,
international airspace, and exclusive economic zones; and the
safety of ships and aircraft exercising the right of distressed
entry.  The Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of
the Defense Ministry, Major General Zhang Bangdong, led
the PLA delegation.
December 5-7 A Working Group under the MMCA met in Beijing.
2002
On January 16, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC citizen
and PRC entities for chemical weapon proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report
RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:
Policy Issues.)
April 10-12 The third plenary meeting under the MMCA was held in
Shanghai.  PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and
Policy (J5), Rear Admiral William Sullivan, and the PLA
Navy’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Zhou Borong,
led the delegations.
On May 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC citizen and
PRC entities for proliferation related to chemical weapons and conventional
weapons in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
April 27-May 1 PRC Vice President Hu Jintao visited PACOM and was
welcomed by Admiral Dennis Blair.  In Washington,
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld welcomed Hu with an honor
cordon at the Pentagon.  PRC media reported that Rumsfeld
and Hu reached a consensus to resume military exchanges,
but the Pentagon’s spokeswoman said that they agreed to
have their representatives talk about how to proceed on mil-
to-mil contacts, which were still approved on a case-by-case
basis.  Vice President Hu also met with President Bush and
Vice President Dick Cheney. 
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May 14-28 The PLA sent observers to Cobra Gold 2002 in Thailand, a
combined exercise involving forces of the United States,
Thailand, and Singapore.
June 26-27 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Peter Rodman visited Beijing to discuss a resumption
of military exchanges. He met with General Xiong Guangkai
and General Chi Haotian, who said that the PRC was ready
to improve military relations with the United States.
Secretary Rumsfeld told reporters on June 21, 2002, that
Rodman would discuss the principles of transparency,
reciprocity, and consistency for mil-to-mil contacts that
Rumsfeld stressed to Vice President Hu Jintao.
On July 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC citizen and
PRC entities for proliferation related to chemical weapons and cruise missiles in
Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
July 15-29 In the first POW/MIA mission in China on a Cold War case,
a team from the Army’s Central Identification Laboratory in
Hawaii (CILHI) went to northeastern Jilin province to search
for, but did not find, the remains of two CIA pilots whose C-
47 plane was shot down in 1952 during the Korean War.
August 6-8 The PLA and DOD held a meeting under the MMCA in
Hawaii.
August-September In a POW/MIA recovery mission, a team from the Army’s
Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI)
recovered remains of the crew of a C-46 cargo plane that
crashed in March 1944 in Tibet  while flying the “Hump”
route over the Himalaya mountains back to India from
Kunming, China, during World War II.  The two-month
operation excavated a site at 15,600 ft.
October 8-14 The President of NDU, Vice Admiral Paul Gaffney, visited
Beijing, Xian, Hangzhou, and Shanghai.  He met with CMC
Vice Chairman and Defense Minister Chi Haotian, Deputy
Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai, and NDU President
Xing Shizhong.
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October 25 President Bush held a summit with PRC President Jiang
Zemin at his ranch in Crawford, TX.  Concerning security
issues, President Bush said they discussed “the threat posed
by the Iraqi regime,” “concern about the acknowledgment of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a program to
enrich uranium,” counter-terrorism (calling China an “ally”),
weapons proliferation, Taiwan, and a “candid, constructive,
and cooperative” relationship with contacts at many levels in
coming months, including “a new dialogue on security
issues.”  Jiang offered a vague proposal to reconsider the
PLA’s missile buildup in return for restraints in U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan.
November 24 In the first U.S. naval port call to mainland China since the




Lieutenant General Gao Jindian, a Vice President of the
NDU, led a Capstone-like delegation to the United States.
December 4-6 The Maritime and Air Safety Working Group under the
MMCA met in Qingdao.  The U.S. team toured the destroyer
Qingdao.
December 9-10 Following a two-year hiatus after the previous Defense
Consultative Talks (DCT) in December 2000, the Pentagon
held the fifth DCT (the first under the Bush Administration)
and kept U.S. representation at the same level as that under
the Clinton Administration.  Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Douglas Feith met with General Xiong Guangkai, a
Deputy Chief of General Staff, at the Pentagon.  The PLA
played up the status of Xiong and the DCT, calling the
meeting “defense consultations at the vice ministerial level.”
At U.S. urging, Xiong brought a proposal for mil-to-mil
exchanges in 2003.  Feith told reporters that he could not
claim progress in gaining greater reciprocity and transparency
in the exchanges, although they had a discussion of these
issues.  They did not discuss Jiang’s offer on the PLA’s
missile buildup.  Feith also said that DOD had no major
change in its attitude toward the PLA since the EP-3 incident.
Secretary Rumsfeld did not meet with Xiong.  Deputy
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice met with Xiong on December 10.
December 12-17 PACOM Commander, Admiral Thomas Fargo, visited
Chengdu, Nanjing, Ningbo, Beijing, and Shanghai.  The PLA
showed him a live-fire exercise conducted by a reserve unit
of an infantry division in Sichuan.  General Liang Guanglie
(Chief of General Staff) met with Admiral Fargo.
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2003
March 25-29 The Director of the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO),
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jerry Jennings, visited
China and met with officials of the PLA, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Red Cross Society of China.  Jennings said that
the PRC has records that may well hold “the key” to helping
DOD to resolve many of the cases of American POWs and
MIAs from the Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Cold
War.  While the PRC has been “very cooperative” in U.S.
investigations of losses from World War II and Vietnam,
Jennings said both sides suggested ways to “enhance
cooperation” on Korean War cases and acknowledged that
there is limited time.  Jennings sought access to information
in PRC archives at the national and provincial levels,
assistance from PRC civilian researchers to conduct archival
research on behalf of the United States, information from the
Dandong Museum relating to two F-86 pilots who are
Korean War MIAs, and resumption of contact with PLA
veterans from the Korean War to build on information related
to the PRC operation of POW camps during the war.
April 9-11 In Hawaii, in the fourth plenary meeting under the MMCA,
PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and Policy (J5),
Rear Admiral William Sullivan, met with PLA Navy’s
Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Zhou Borong.
April 25-May 4 The Commandant of the PLA’s NDU, Lieutenant General Pei
Huailiang, led a delegation to visit the U.S. Naval Academy
in Annapolis, MD; U.S. NDU in Washington, DC; Marine
Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, CA; and PACOM in
Honolulu, HI.
On May 23, 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC entity for
missile proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
On June 26, 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on PRC entities for
missile  proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
On July 30, 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC entity for
missile proliferation in a publicly unnamed country.  (See CRS Report RL31555,
China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues.)
CRS-54
August 19-21 The Military Maritime and Air Safety Working Group under
the MMCA met in Hawaii.  The PLA delegation met with
PACOM’s Chief of Staff for the Director for Strategic
Planning and Policy, Brigadier General (USAF) Charles
Neeley, and toured the U.S. Aegis-equipped cruiser USS
Lake Erie.
August 25 The PLA arranged for 27 military observers from the United
States and other countries to be the first foreign military
observers to visit China’s largest combined arms training
base (in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) and watch
an exercise that involved elements of force-on-force, live-
fire, and joint operational maneuvers conducted by the
Beijing Military Region.
On September 19, 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC
entity for missile proliferation in a publicly unnamed country, again denying
satellite exports to China.  The Administration also banned imports from that
entity while waiving for one year a ban on imports of other PRC government
products related to missiles, space systems, electronics, and military aircraft.  (See
CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
September 22-26 In the first foreign naval ship visit to Zhanjiang, the cruiser
USS Cowpens and frigate USS Vandegrift visited this
homeport of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet.  Its Chief of Staff,
Rear Admiral Hou Yuexi, welcomed Rear Admiral James
Kelly, Commander of Carrier Group Five, who also visited.
October 22-25 The PLAN destroyer Shenzhen and supply ship Qinghai Lake
visited Guam.
October 24-29 CMC Vice Chairman and PRC Defense Minister, General
Cao Gangchuan, visited PACOM in Hawaii, West Point in
New York, and Washington, DC, where he met with
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State
Colin Powell.  General Cao stressed that Taiwan was the
most important issue. The PLA sought the same treatment for
General Cao as that given to General Chi Haotian when he
visited Washington as defense minister in 1996 and was
granted a meeting with President Clinton.  In the end,
President Bush dropped by for five minutes when General
Cao met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
at the White House.  Rumsfeld did not attend the PRC
Embassy’s banquet for General Cao.
CRS-55
November 12-19 Nanjing Military Region Commander, Lieutenant General
Zhu Wenquan, visited PACOM where he met with Admiral
Thomas Fargo and boarded the destroyer USS Russell.  LTG
Zhu also visited San Diego, where he toured the carrier USS
Nimitz and the Marine Corps Recruit Depot.  He also
stopped in Washington, DC, and West Point in New York.
On November 18, 2003, a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who is a PLA major
general, Wang Zaixi, issued a threat to use force against the perceived open
promotion of Taiwan independence.  Campaigning for re-election on March 20,
2004, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian was calling for controversial
referendums and a new Taiwan constitution.  On the eve of his visit to
Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao threatened that China would “pay any price
to safeguard the unity of the motherland.”  On December 3, PRC media reported
the warnings of a PLA major general and a senior colonel at AMS, who wrote that
Chen’s use of referendums to seek independence will push Taiwan into the “abyss
of war.”  They warned that China would be willing to pay the costs of war,
including boycotts of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, drops in foreign investment,
setbacks in foreign relations, wartime damage to the southeastern coast, economic
costs, and PLA casualties.  Appearing with Premier Wen at the White House on
December 9, 2003, President Bush said that “we oppose any unilateral decision by
either China or Taiwan to change the status quo.  And the comments and actions
made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions
unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”  (See CRS Report
RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)
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2004
January 13-16 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (USAF)
Richard Myers, visited Beijing, the first visit to China by the
highest-ranking U.S. military officer since November 2000.
General Myers met with Generals Guo Boxiong and Cao
Gangchuan (CMC Vice Chairmen) and General Liang
Guanglie (PLA Chief of General Staff).  CMC Chairman
Jiang Zemin met briefly with Myers, echoing President
Bush’s brief meeting with General Cao.  The PLA generals
and Jiang stressed Taiwan as their critical issue.  General
Myers stressed that the United States has a responsibility
under the TRA to assist Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and
to ensure that there will be no temptation to use force.  Myers
pointed to the PLA’s missile buildup as a threat to Taiwan.
The PLA allowed Myers to be the first foreign visitor to tour
the Beijing Aerospace Control Center, headquarters of its
space program.  Myers discussed advancing mil-to-mil
contacts, including search and rescue exercises, educational
exchanges, ship visits, and senior-level exchanges (including
a visit by General Liang Guanglie).  Myers also indicated a
U.S. expectation of exchanges between younger officers,
saying that interactions at the lower level can improve mutual
understanding in the longer run.
February 10-11 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith visited
Beijing to hold the sixth DCT with General Xiong Guangkai,
a meeting which the PLA side claimed to be “defense
consultations at the vice ministerial level.”  Feith met with
General Cao Gangchuan (a CMC Vice Chairman and
Defense Minister), who raised extensively the issue of
Taiwan and the referendums.  Feith said he discussed North
Korean nuclear weapons, Taiwan, and maritime safety.  He
stressed that avoiding a war in the Taiwan Strait was in the
interests of both countries and that belligerent rhetoric and
the PLA’s missile buildup do not help to reduce cross-strait
tensions.  The PRC’s Foreign Ministry said that the two sides
discussed a program for mil-to-mil contacts in 2004.  The
Department of Defense proposed a hotline with the PLA.
February 24-28 The USS Blue Ridge, the 7th Fleet’s command ship, visited
Shanghai.  In conjunction with the port call, Vice Admiral
Robert Willard, Commander of the 7th Fleet, met with Rear
Admiral Zhao Guojun, Commander of the East Sea Fleet.
March 9-11 The Maritime and Air Safety Working Group under the
MMCA met in Shanghai.  The U.S. visitors met with Rear
Admiral Zhou Borong, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN,
and toured the frigate Lianyungang.
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On April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on PRC entities for
weapons proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
May 3-June 29 A team from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
(JPAC) traveled to northeastern city of Dandong near
China’s border with North Korea on an operation to recover
remains of a pilot whose F-86 fighter was shot down during
the Korean War.  In following up on an initial operation in
July 2002 on a Cold War case, the U.S. team also went to
northeastern Jilin province to recover remains of two CIA
pilots whose C-47 transport plane was shot down in 1952.
July 21-25 PACOM Commander, Admiral Thomas Fargo, visited China
and met with General Liu Zhenwu (Guangzhou Military
Region Commander), Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing,
General Liang Guanglie (Chief of General Staff), and
General Xiong Guangkai (a Deputy Chief of General Staff),
who opposed U.S. arms sales and defense cooperation with
Taiwan.  Fargo said that policy on Taiwan has not changed.
August-September DPMO sent a team to Tibet to recover wreckage from a site
where a C-46 aircraft crashed during World War II.
On September 20, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on a PRC
entity for missile proliferation in a publicly unnamed country.  (See CRS Report
RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:
Policy Issues.)
On September 23, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on PRC
entities for weapons proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
September 24-27 The USS Cushing, a destroyer with the Pacific Fleet, visited
Qingdao for a port visit.
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October 24-30 Reciprocating General Myers’ visit to China, PLA Chief of
General Staff, General Liang Guanglie, visited the United
States, including the Joint Forces Command and Joint Forces
Staff College at Norfolk; the carrier USS George Washington
and the destroyer USS Laboon at Norfolk Naval Base; Air
Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base; Joint Task
Force-Civil Support at Fort Monroe; Army Infantry Center at
Fort Benning; Washington, D.C.; and Air Force Academy in
Colorado Springs.  In Washington, General Liang held
meetings with  National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and General Richard Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld saw General Liang briefly.  Talks covered military
exchanges, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and Taiwan.
November 22-23 DPMO held Technical Talks in Beijing on POW/MIA
recovery operations in 2005.
On November 24, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on PRC
entities for weapons proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
On December 27, 2004, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on PRC
entities for weapons proliferation in Iran.  (See CRS Report RL31555, China and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.)
2005
J a n u a r y  3 0 -
February 1
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless visited
Beijing to hold a Special Policy Dialogue for the first time,
Meeting with Zhang Bangdong, Director of the PLA’s
Foreign Affairs Office, Lawless discussed maritime and air
safety, the program of military contacts in 2005, the U.S.
proposal of February 2004 for a hotline, Taiwan, the DCTs,
PLA’s buildup, and a possible visit by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Lawless also met with General Xiong Guangkai.
February 23-25 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs
Jerry Jennings visited Beijing and Dandong to discuss
China’s assistance in resolving cases from the Vietnam War
and World War II.  He also continued to seek access to
China’s documents related to POW camps that China
managed during the Korean War.  At Dandong, Jennings
announced the recovery of the remains of a U.S. Air Force
pilot who was missing-in-action from the Korean War.
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April 29-30 General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff,
visited Washington to hold the seventh DCT with Under
Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith.  They continued to
discuss the U.S. proposal for a hotline with the PLA and also
talked about military exchanges, international security issues,
PLA modernization, U.S. military redeployments, and
energy.  Xiong also met with Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley,
and Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns.
